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ARTICLE
PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE
Brian D. Feinstein* & Daniel J. Hemel**
Dozens of multimember agencies across the federal government are
subject to partisan balance requirements, which mandate that no more
than a simple majority of agency members may hail from a single party.
Administrative law scholars and political scientists have questioned
whether these provisions meaningfully affect the ideological composition
of federal agencies. In theory, Presidents can comply with these requirements by appointing ideologically sympathetic members of the opposite
party once they have filled their quota of same-party appointees (i.e., a
Democratic President can appoint liberal Republicans or a Republican
President can appoint conservative Democrats). No multiagency study
in the past fifty years, however, has examined whether—in practice—
partisan balance requirements actually prevent Presidents from
selecting like-minded individuals for cross-party appointments.
This Article fills that gap. We gather data on 578 appointees to
twenty-three agencies over the course of six presidencies and thirty-six
years. We identify the estimated ideological preferences of those
appointees based on personal campaign contributions. We then compare
the ideological preferences of co-party and cross-party appointees across
agencies and across presidencies. The analysis indicates that partisan
balance requirements had at most a modest impact on the ideological
composition of multimember agencies from the late 1970s to the early
1990s but a stronger effect from the mid-1990s onward. This Article
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considers several possible explanations for these findings. The results
are consistent with a story of “partisan sort”: As ideology and party
affiliation have become more tightly linked, cross-party appointees have
become more likely to share the ideological preferences of their copartisans rather than those of the appointing President. The findings
suggest that the increasing polarization of political parties is
contributing to a concomitant increase in the ideological heterogeneity
of multimember agencies subject to partisan balance mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
Partisan balance requirements (PBRs) are a common—and
controversial—feature of federal agency design. These provisions
generally mandate that only a bare majority of commissioners of a
multimember agency can hail from the same political party. More than
half of all multimember agencies within the federal government are now
subject to these party-balance rules, ranging from little-known entities
like the African Development Foundation to high-profile agencies such
as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).1 Yet, despite the prevalence of PBRs,
scholars of administrative law lack even a basic understanding of how
these mandates affect the ideological composition and policy outputs of
multimember agencies. This Article sheds light on PBRs and their
consequences.
A number of commentators have doubted whether PBRs materially
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies. They point
out that Presidents can comply with the letter of the law simply by
selecting an appointee who is nominally registered as a member of the
opposite party or as an independent, even if that individual is otherwise
the President’s ideological ally. This view was perhaps most clearly stated
in a 1976 report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee,
which averred that neither Republican nor Democratic Presidents had
chosen “‘bona fide, honest-to-God’ members of the other party” to fill
cross-party seats.2
Until scholars can determine empirically whether PBRs
meaningfully constrain a President’s ability to appoint ideologically
sympathetic commissioners to multimember agencies, it will be difficult
to say much about the positive or normative implications of these
statutory requirements. And yet, in the last half century, not a single
academic article has systematically examined whether and how PBRs
affect the ideological composition of the agencies to which they apply.
One study has sought to measure the effect of partisan balance on voting
patterns at the FCC specifically,3 and a handful of scholars have offered
1. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 797 tbl.4 (2013).
2. Staff of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission (1949–1974), at 386 (Comm. Print 1976).
3. Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan
Requirements on Regulation 1–3 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://perma.cc/F8MW-6WN8 (“[T]he effect of commissioner ideology on voting is
profound. Commissioner partisan affiliation exhibits robust and large predictive power
over votes, even holding constant the party of the appointing president.”); see also
Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962–
1975, 20 J. Broadcasting 239, 241 (1976) (providing an earlier look at FCC voting patterns
based on political affiliation).
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anecdotal observations that speak to this question.4 But for the last
systematic, cross-agency empirical analysis of PBRs’ effect on agencies’
ideological composition, one has to look all the way back to a 1964 study
by political scientists Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin.5
A lot has changed since 1964. Back then, both major political parties
were ideological “big tents”: The Democratic Party included a staunchly
conservative southern base, which found itself to the right of
“Rockefeller Republicans” from the North on several major issues.6 By
the turn of the twenty-first century, however, partisan identity had
become a much more reliable predictor of ideology—a phenomenon
known as “partisan sort.”7 Meanwhile, developments in campaign
finance law, information technology, and empirical social science have
made individual ideology much easier to observe. The Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 for the first time required candidates and political
parties to disclose the identities of their contributors as well as the
amounts donated.8 Those records have been open to the public in a
computer-searchable form since 1980,9 and they have been posted on the
Internet in a searchable format since 1998.10 While an individual’s
campaign contributions are not a perfect proxy for ideology, recent
political science research suggests that donations closely track ideological
preferences.11 By leveraging information on campaign contributions
made by individuals across several election cycles, researchers can
4. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
5. Stuart Nagel & Martin Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and Party Politics, 17
Admin. L. Rev. 39 (1964) (studying the influence of party affiliation on the
decisionmaking of seven regulatory agencies).
6. See Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and
Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 1–2 (2005) (describing
how southern congressional Democrats, who had previously aligned with northern
Democrats, came to align with Republicans on labor issues in the 1940s); Eric Schickler,
Kathryn Pearson & Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics from
1933 to 1972, 72 J. Pol. 672, 672–73 (2010) (describing how northern Democrats took the
lead on advancing civil rights legislation beginning in the 1940s, with Republicans in the
middle—offering tepid support and occasional behind-the-scenes opposition—and with
southern Democrats firmly opposed).
7. See Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats
and Conservatives Became Republicans 2–11 (2009) (defining the term “partisan sort”).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 304, 308(a)(4), 86 Stat. 3, 14–15, 17 (1972).
9. Telephone Interview with Senior Pub. Affairs Specialist, Pub. Records Branch,
FEC (May 30, 2017) (call notes on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also 49 Fed. Reg.
22,335, 22,336 (May 29, 1984) (setting fees for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests concerning “computer search[es] of an entire individual contributor file for
contributions made by a particular individual or individuals”).
10. Press Release, FEC, FEC Launches New Web Info (July 21, 1998),
http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm
[http://perma.cc/RA8G-EAAW].
The FEC first made “comprehensive computer files containing campaign finance
information” available online in 1996 and introduced a search function two years later. Id.
11. See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367
(2014) [hereinafter Bonica, Ideological Marketplace].
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distinguish among liberals, moderates, and conservatives within the same
political party—both those who hold government office and those who
don’t—in a much more reliable way than past generations of scholars
possibly could.
All this means that a comprehensive, cross-agency empirical analysis
of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember
boards and commissions is long overdue. This Article fills that void.
Before delving into the analysis, this Article considers two explanations as
to why limitations on the partisan composition of agencies might affect
the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a supply-side theory
and a demand-side theory. (It also considers alternative theories that
focus on search costs and identity signaling.) The supply-side theory
posits that there is only a small pool of liberal Republicans and
conservative Democrats who are potentially qualified to serve as
commissioners, and so Presidents looking for competent cross-party
appointees whose ideological preferences track their own will often find
themselves out of luck. Thus, Presidents who are required by PBRs to
make cross-party appointments to multimember agencies will be
compelled by supply-side constraints to choose a genuine cross-partisan.
Whereas the supply-side theory focuses on the first stage of the
appointment process—the selection of a nominee—the demand-side
theory focuses on the end stage: confirmation. The demand-side theory
emphasizes that nominees to federal agencies ultimately must be “sold”
to the Senate, since a majority vote of the Senate is necessary for
confirmation. On this view, consumers in the confirmation market
(senators) demand cross-party appointees who are bona fide members of
that party and thus force the President to choose commissioners from
the other side of the ideological spectrum.
The supply-side and demand-side theories both suggest that PBRs
will affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies, but
they generate different predictions as to when and why. If the supply-side
theory is correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs growing
over time in tandem with partisan sort. If the demand-side theory is
correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs most strongly in
periods of divided government, when the opposition party in the Senate
has leverage to force the President’s hand.
To assess the effect of PBRs and test these and other theories, we
gather data on the identities of 578 appointees to twenty-three agencies
over the course of six presidencies and thirty-six years (1979 through
2014). We then use data on those individuals’ campaign contributions to
estimate their ideological preferences. We compare the (estimated) ideological preferences of appointees to those of their appointing Presidents,
and we compare co-party appointees (i.e., a Democrat appointed by a
Democratic President or a Republican appointed by a Republican
President) to cross-party appointees (i.e., a Republican appointed by a
Democratic President or vice versa). We show how the effects of PBRs on
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the ideological composition of federal agencies vary over time and with
changes in control of Congress.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that partisan balance
requirements do “bite.” When Presidents are required by law to make
cross-party appointments, they generally choose “bona fide, honest-toGod” members of the opposite party—or, at least, individuals whose
observed ideologies are significantly different from the President’s own.
Looking at the thirty-six-year period overall, Republican Presidents
appoint Democrats who are more liberal than they are and more liberal
than their Republican co-party appointees are. Likewise, Democratic
Presidents appoint Republicans who are more conservative than they and
their Democratic co-party appointees are.
Second, the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies is much more pronounced today than it was at the
beginning of our study period. This finding is consistent with the supplyside theory and our expectations based on partisan sort. President Jimmy
Carter often named relatively moderate Republicans as cross-party
appointees; Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush often
appointed centrist or conservative Democrats. By the time President Bill
Clinton took office, however, this phenomenon had subsided.
Republicans appointed by Presidents Clinton and Obama tended to be
quite conservative, and Democrats appointed by President George W.
Bush tended to be quite liberal.
Third, we find no apparent relationship between the presence or absence of divided government and the ideological distance between the
President and cross-party appointees. This finding is at odds with the
demand-side theory, which would lead us to expect the effect to be most
pronounced when the White House and the Senate are controlled by different parties. While we do not dismiss the demand-side explanation
entirely, our analysis suggests that supply-side factors do more to mediate
the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember
agencies.
This Article concludes by considering the implications of our empirical analysis for the scholarly understanding of PBRs. It identifies three
main accounts of partisan balance requirements in the administrative law
literature. One account, which pulls insights from political science, posits
that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress in monitoring agency actions (the monitoring account). On this view, PBRs ensure that agencies include members whose policy preferences diverge from the sitting
President’s, and these minority members will alert lawmakers if members
from the President’s party stray from legislators’ preferences.12 A second
account, drawing on social psychology literature, suggests that PBRs can
improve agencies’ deliberative processes by offsetting tendencies toward

12. See infra section III.A.
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group polarization (the deliberation account).13 According to this view,
PBRs ensure that multimember agencies include a diverse set of
perspectives, thereby counterbalancing tendencies toward group
polarization. Apart from any effect on the cost of congressional
monitoring, this account suggests that PBRs can improve federal
administration by raising the quality of agency decisionmaking.14 A third
account, rooted in constitutional law scholarship on the “unitary
executive,” posits that PBRs obstruct the President in the execution of
her constitutional responsibilities (the obstruction account).15 According to
this view, PBRs “quite literally force Presidents to rely on political
enemies to carry out their executive duties,”16 and thus potentially
prevent Presidents from implementing their policy agendas.17
These three accounts are not mutually exclusive: In theory, PBRs
could reduce the cost to Congress of monitoring multimember agencies,
counterbalance tendencies toward group polarization within agencies,
and force Presidents to rely on their political enemies. Moreover, these
three perspectives on PBRs all rest on the same empirical premise: that
PBRs actually operate as meaningful constraints on the President’s ability
to appoint commissioners who share her ideology and policy
preferences. Our findings shore up that empirical premise, though they
fall short of confirming the more ambitious claims that each account
makes. Our analysis also indicates that the effects of PBRs on the
operation of multimember agencies are potentially quite different today
than they were three decades ago, when PBRs had a less dramatic effect
on ideological composition. This finding suggests that conclusions
regarding PBRs drawn from the period before partisan sort should be
reassessed anew. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, this Article
suggests that, despite concerns that PBRs weaken presidential control
over multimember agencies, the fact that PBRs are relatively effective
actually makes them less threatening to the sitting President. The
rationale for this counterintuitive conclusion is explained at greater
length below.18
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
Yale L.J. 71, 74 (2000) (defining group polarization as involving “members of a
deliberating group predictably mov[ing] toward a more extreme point in the direction
indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies”).
14. See infra section III.B.
15. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge & Wesley W. Wintermyer,
Partisan Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 941,
991–99 (2015) (“Although statutory partisan balance requirements may appear innocuous
or even beneficial at first glance, these provisions have far-reaching ramifications on the
President’s ability to properly influence and oversee federal agencies.”).
16. Id. at 991.
17. Id. at 995.
18. In brief, PBRs ensure that Presidents inherit commissions with only a bare
majority of members from the opposition party. For a commission with fixed terms for
appointees and a PBR, this means that in expectation, it will take less time for a new
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For the optimist, our results might suggest that there is an
unexpected upside to partisan sort: As the parties become less
ideologically diverse, multimember agencies become more so. While the
phenomenon of partisan sort has fueled concerns about group
polarization in government institutions,19 our results suggest that the
combination of partisan sort and partisan balance requirements
improves the prospects for ideological diversity within multimember
agencies. We caution, though, that sweeping normative conclusions are
premature: Our study addresses the effect of PBRs on the ideological
diversity of multimember agencies, not the effect of ideological diversity
on agency functioning. We cannot yet claim that PBRs are desirable
because ideologically diverse agencies function better than agencies with
monolithic memberships. What we can say is that for such a claim to be
true, it must first be true that PBRs actually lead to more ideologically
diverse agencies, and our results strongly affirm that first premise.
While our study is primarily backward-looking, our findings have
clear implications going forward for the evaluation of cross-party
appointments under President Trump and subsequent administrations.
Without knowing whether past Presidents have named genuine crosspartisans to PBR agencies, it is difficult to determine whether a new
White House occupant is acting consistent with established norms. At the
same time, a President can potentially skew the composition of PBR
agencies by quickly making co-party appointments while stalling on
cross-party nominations. However, by documenting past practices
regarding appointments to PBR agencies, this study establishes a baseline
that can facilitate future comparative evaluations.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on
PBRs, reviews the existing literature on these requirements, and
considers causal pathways by which these requirements might affect the
ideological composition of multimember agencies. Part II describes our
data and methodology and presents our main empirical results. Part III
discusses the implications of our results and identifies areas for future
research.

President to “flip” the commission to include a majority of her party’s members than it
would for an otherwise identical multimember commission with a fixed-term provision
and no PBR. See infra section III.C.
19. See David A. Jones, The Polarizing Effect of a Partisan Workplace, 46 PS: Pol. Sci.
& Pol. 67, 69–71 & figs.3 & 4 (2013) (reporting evidence of group polarization at federal
and other inside-the-Beltway workplaces); see also James B. Stewart, Case Study in Chaos:
How Management Experts Grade a Trump White House, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/donald-trump-management-style.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting a management expert’s concerns
regarding “group think” in the Trump Administration).
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I. PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND EXISTING
EVIDENCE
This first Part provides an overview of partisan balance requirements
in agency organic statutes and considers reasons why these requirements
might (or might not) affect the ideological makeup of boards and commissions. Section I.A briefly summarizes the history of PBRs. Section I.B
surveys the literature on the efficacy of PBRs. Section I.C considers causal
pathways through which PBRs might operate and explains how these
different causal stories can be disentangled.
A.

A Short History of Partisan Balance Requirements

Partisan balance requirements for federal agencies date at least as
far back as the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882.20 The Act prohibited
polygamists from voting or running in Utah elections. A new Utah
Commission was tasked with enforcing the anti-polygamy requirements.
Section 9 of the Act stated that the Board should consist of “five persons,
to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of one political
party . . . .”21 Similar PBRs appeared in several more nineteenth-century
statutes, including the Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the Civil
Service Commission; 22 the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which created the Interstate Commerce Commission; 23 and an 1890 law
establishing a nine-member board of general appraisers that would
ascertain the value of merchandise for customs purposes.24 Congress also
included PBRs in a number of statutes creating commissions to negotiate
treaties with Native American tribes at the century’s end.25 Perhaps not
coincidentally, the 1880s also saw a national movement for civil service
reform, and these first PBRs limited the President’s ability to adopt a “to
the victor go the spoils” posture in appointments.26 Yet these first few
PBRs do not appear to have elicited much discussion in the House or in

20. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30; see also Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15,
at 964.
21. § 9, 22 Stat. at 32 (emphasis added).
22. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; see also Krotoszynski et al., supra note
15, at 966.
23. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
24. Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136.
25. See Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 342; Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164,
27 Stat. 120, 138–39; Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807, 26 Stat. 336, 354; Act of Mar. 2, 1889,
ch. 412, § 14, 25 Stat. 980, 1005. Justice Brandeis documents the early history of PBRs in
his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 269–71 & n.51 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
26. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the
Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1389 (2010).
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the Senate, and—speculation aside—the initial reason for their insertion
remains obscure.27
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought with it the next golden
age of PBRs. Wilson’s first term saw the creation of five major
multimember agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes: the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC),28 the Federal Farm Loan Board,29 the U.S.
Shipping Board,30 the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission,31 and
the U.S. Tariff Commission.32 At the time, senators suggested that PBRs
would make agencies less prone to partisan bias and more likely to act on
the basis of expertise—though precisely how PBRs might produce these
results remained unspecified.33
The creation of new agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes has
continued ever since. In the last century, Congress has established at
least forty bodies subject to PBRs.34 Most of these statutes provide for an
odd number of members, no more than a bare majority of whom may be
from the same political party.35 The organic statutes of a small handful of
agencies (most significantly, the Federal Election Commission (FEC))
provide for an even number of members, with no more than half from
the same party.36
Significantly, the PBR provisions in agency organic statutes do not
technically require a Democratic President to appoint Republicans or a
Republican President to appoint Democrats. For example, the Equal
27. See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964–65, 967.
28. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (providing that “[n]ot more
than three of the [appointed] commissioners shall be members of the same political
party”).
29. Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, § 3, 39 Stat. 360, 360 (“Of the four members to be
appointed by the President, not more than two shall be appointed from one political
party.”).
30. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 728, 729 (“Not more than three of the
commissioners shall be appointed from the same political party.”).
31. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748 (“No more than two of [the
appointed] commissioners shall be members of the same political party.”).
32. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (providing that there will be
“six members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political
party”).
33. See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 969–70 (discussing Congress’s rationale
for creating PBRs).
34. See id. at 1009–15 tbl.1, 1016 tbl.2, 1017 tbl.3.
35. Id. (noting the partisan membership requirements for independent agencies
listed in the tables).
36. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
sec. 1, § 101, 90 Stat. 475, 475 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2012)).
Other extant agencies with an even number of members and a requirement that no more
than half hail from the same party include the International Trade Commission, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) (2012), and the Election Assistance Commission, 52 U.S.C. § 20923(b)(2)
(Supp. II 2015).
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Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) organic statute states
that “not more than three [of the five commissioners] shall be members
of the same political party.”37 Thus, a Republican President could
appoint three Republican commissioners and two independents (or, for
that matter, two libertarians), rather than naming two Democrats. In
practice, though, we see very few cases of Presidents naming
independents to cross-party posts on PBR agencies. Indeed, in our review
of 216 cross-party appointments to twenty-three PBR agencies between
1979 and 2014, we have identified only seven cases in which a President
named an independent at a time when a PBR prohibited him from
appointing a member of his own party to an agency.38
These seven cases, moreover, do not suggest a pattern of Presidents
attempting to manipulate PBRs by filling cross-party seats with likeminded independents. Three of the seven cases involved a Democratic
President filling a cross-party seat with an appointee who, though
registered as an independent, had previously worked as an aide to a
Republican senator.39 Two more involved Republican Presidents filling
cross-party seats with independents who would later be chosen by
Democratic Presidents for positions to which the Democratic President
could have named a Democrat—an indication that the individual,
though registered as an independent, was generally aligned with the
Democratic Party.40 One case involved President Clinton appointing to
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012).
38. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
39. The three are: Don Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter to the NLRB in
1980; Reginald Jones, appointed by President Clinton to the EEOC in 1996; and Jackie
Clegg, appointed by Clinton to the Export-Import Bank in 1997. See James A. Gross,
Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy, 1947–1994, at 245–46
(1995) (noting that Zimmerman had served as an adviser to Republican Senator Jacob
Javits of New York); Lee Davidson, Utah Nominee Gets High Marks, Deseret News (Salt
Lake City) (May 23, 1997), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/562187/Utah-nominee-getshigh-marks.html [http://perma.cc/DUE5-UMHA] (noting that Clegg had served as an
aide to Republican Senator Jake Garn of Utah); Press Release, White House Office of the
Press Sec’y, President Clinton Names Reginald E. Jones to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (June 5, 1996), http://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/
1996/06/1996-06-06-jones-on-equal-employment-opportunity-commission.html [http://
perma.cc/87C9-QDYT] (noting that Jones, at the time of his appointment, was senior
legislative counsel to then-Republican Senator James Jeffords of Vermont).
40. The two are: Mary Schapiro, appointed by President Reagan to the SEC in 1988
and reappointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1989, and Thomas Curry, appointed
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) by President George W. Bush in
2003. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Official from F.D.I.C. Picked to Lead Banking Regulator,
N.Y.
Times
(July
1,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/business/
02currency.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting President Obama’s
nomination of Curry to be Comptroller of the Currency, a position not subject to a
PBR); Hannah Bergman, FDIC Board Is Factor in OCC Choice, Am. Banker (Jan. 12, 2005),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/fdic-board-is-factor-in-occ-choice (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that Curry was an independent named by President
George W. Bush to a cross-party seat); Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Clinton Expected to Name
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the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) an independent who
had been recommended by the Board’s outgoing Republican member.41
Indeed, in only one case did we find any record of complaints that the
President had appointed an independent rather than a member of the
opposite party to fill a cross-party seat.42
The only agency at which Presidents have repeatedly sought to fill
cross-party seats with ideologically sympathetic independents is—perhaps
surprisingly—an agency with no regulatory authority: the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights.43 (We exclude the Commission on Civil
Rights from our dataset because of its lack of authority to bind others
through regulation, adjudication, or enforcement, as well as the fact that
half of its members are chosen by Congress rather than the President

S.E.C. Member to Head C.F.T.C., N.Y. Times (May 3, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/
05/03/business/clinton-expected-to-name-sec-member-to-head-cftc.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that President Clinton would name Schapiro to chair
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) at a time when the commission
already had two Republican members, meaning Clinton could have named a fellow
Democrat); Kathleen Pender, Mary Schapiro’s Mixed Marks as SEC Head, S.F. Chron. (Nov.
26, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Mary-Schapiro-s-mixedmarks-as-SEC-head-4068463.php [http://perma.cc/9LBY-75RP] (noting that Schapiro,
named by President Obama in 2009 to chair the SEC, served with two Republicans,
meaning that Obama could have named a third registered Democrat instead of Schapiro);
Vicky Stamas, President to Nominate Reum to Fill Position Remaining at the SEC, Bond
Buyer, Aug. 21, 1992, at 5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Schapiro was
an independent in a cross-party seat).
41. President Clinton appointed John Goglia to the NTSB in 1995 and reappointed
him in 1999. See Matthew Brelis, US Transportation Appointee Brings Hands-On View; 29
Years as Air Mechanic Won Spot for Saugus Man, Bos. Globe, Oct. 10, 1995, at 18 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); The Former Board of the NTSB, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd.,
http://www.ntsb.gov/about/board/Pages/former_members.aspx [http://perma.cc/2FPYZG4H] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (noting that Goglia served on the NTSB from 1995 to
2004).
42. President Reagan named Mary Azcuenaga to the FTC in 1984. Her appointment
generated grumbling from one Democratic senator who “wondered why Mr. Reagan, if he
wants to appoint independents, cannot pick them for Republican seats.” Robert D.
Hershey, Jr., Washington Watch; No Democrats Seen for F.T.C., N.Y. Times (Oct. 28,
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/28/business/washington-watch-no-democratsseen-for-ftc.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (paraphrasing Senator Wendell
Ford, a Democrat from Kentucky). However, the outgoing Democratic commissioner was
reported to favorably view Azcuenaga, who replaced him. See Thomas Ferraro, Reagan
Expected to Name Woman to Replace FTC’s Pertschuk, UPI (Aug. 14, 1984),
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/08/14/Reagan-expected-to-name-woman-toreplace-FTCs-Pertschuk/9862461304000 [http://perma.cc/A7SA-GSHN] (quoting an
aide to the outgoing Democratic commissioner who said that the commissioner “respects”
Azcuenaga and was “relatively pleased” that she would be his successor).
43. See Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, Bos.
Globe (Nov. 6, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/11/06/
maneuver_gave_bush_a_conservative_rights_panel/?page=full [http://perma.cc/57GPFE7N] (“Especially since the 1980s, presidents and lawmakers have tried to tilt the panel
by appointing independents who shared their party’s views on civil rights.”).
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and its members generally serve part-time.44) The Commission’s organic
statute states that “[n]ot more than 4 of the [8] members shall at any one
time be of the same political party.”45 The meaning of this provision was
tested in 2003 and 2004, when two Republican members of the
Commission changed their registration to independent.46 Their switches
allowed President George W. Bush to name two additional Republicans
to the commission, bringing the number of Republican or recently
Republican members of the panel to six.47 At the time, the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Justice Department issued an opinion stating that,
for purposes of the statutory PBR, “the relevant consideration is the party
affiliation of the other members at the time the new member is
appointed.”48 In the Office of Legal Counsel’s view, application of the
statutory PBR did not require looking beyond party registration to
determine the partisan identity of a prospective or current
commissioner.
Aside from the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, there is very little
legal precedent regarding the interpretation or application of partisan
balance requirements in agency organic statutes. The constitutionality of
PBRs has been challenged in two cases, but the courts did not reach the
merits of the constitutional issue in either case. In FEC v. NRA Political
Victory Fund, the National Rifle Association’s political action committee
argued that the provision in the six-member FEC’s organic statute
capping the number of commissioners from any political party at three
violated the President’s appointment power.49 The D.C. Circuit rejected
the argument on standing grounds, reasoning that “it is impossible to
determine in this case whether the statute actually limited the President’s
appointment power” because it was not clear that the President
otherwise would have sought to appoint more than three commissioners
from his own party.50 In National Committee of the Reform Party v. Democratic
National Committee, the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the FEC’s
partisan balance requirement on similar grounds, emphasizing that

44. Of the Commission’s eight members, four are appointed by the President, two
are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate on the recommendation of the
Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and two are appointed by the Speaker of the House
on the recommendation of the House Majority and Minority Leaders. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b)
(2012).
45. Id.
46. See Savage, supra note 43 (“Critics say Bush in effect installed a fifth and sixth
Republican on the panel in December 2004, after two commissioners, both Republicans
when appointed, reregistered as independents.”).
47. Id.
48. Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Comm’n, 28 Op. O.L.C. 295,
295 (2004).
49. 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
50. Id.
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“without the statute the President could have appointed exactly the same
members.”51
We know of no case in which a litigant has sought judicial
enforcement of a PBR—that is, has argued for the invalidation of an
agency action on the grounds that a commission had too many members
of the same party. At the same time, we have found no reported instances
of outright PBR violations—no case, that is, in which a President has
sought to exceed the statutory cap on commissioners from a single party.
The letter, if not the spirit, of PBRs is followed uniformly. But to say that
PBRs are followed as a technical matter does not explain what substantive
effects these provisions have. The following section turns to that question
and surveys the scant scholarly literature that exists to date.
B.

Do Partisan Balance Requirements Bite?

Our central aim is to test the hypothesis that partisan balance
requirements affect the ideological composition of multimember
agencies. A contrary view posits that cross-party commissioners “come in
sheep’s clothing” and do not differ from a President’s co-party
appointees in any way other than the superficial fact of party
registration.52 One scholar has noted the example of Ray Wakefield, a
nominally Republican but questionably conservative Roosevelt nominee
to the FCC.53 Timothy Nokken and Brian Sala cite examples from the
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter Administrations.54 An
51. 168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 825).
52. See Ho, supra note 3, at 2–3 (collecting sources that make this claim).
53. See Lawrence W. Lichty, Members of the Federal Radio Commission and Federal
Communications Commission 1927–1961, 6 J. Broadcasting 23, 25 (1961); accord
Williams, supra note 3, at 241 (concluding that “party affiliation has not been a reliable
predictor of voting” on the FCC).
54. Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of
Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. Theoretical Pol. 91, 95 (2000).
In particular, Nokken and Sala note that President Eisenhower appointed two nominally
Democratic FTC commissioners whose ideological loyalties were suspect: Robert Secrest, a
conservative Democratic congressman from Ohio, and William Kern, previously an FTC
staff member “whose principal Democratic credentials were that his father had been
William Jennings Bryan’s running mate in 1908.” Id. (quoting Staff of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission (1949–1974), at 385
(Comm. Print 1976)). Nokken and Sala add that “Kennedy and Nixon adopted similar
appointment strategies by appointing liberal ‘Lindsay Republicans’ and conservative
‘Connally Democrats,’ respectively.” Id. And they further mention the case of Frank
Reiche, one of President Carter’s cross-party appointees to the FEC, whom some
Republican senators opposed because he was not sufficiently conservative. Id. at 95 & n.6;
see also Princeton Attorney Confirmed to Post on Election Panel, Asbury Park Press, July
26, 1979, at 62 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that twenty-one out of fortyone Republican senators voted against Reiche, with some conservative Republicans saying
that he did not represent their views).
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especially notorious example from the Nixon Administration is that of
James Quello, a nominally cross-party appointee to the FCC who—
despite his Democratic affiliation—donated $1,100 to Nixon’s reelection
effort in 1972.55 A report commissioned by the Senate Commerce
Committee and completed at the end of the Ford presidency concluded
that cross-party appointees “typically” support the President who selected
them.56 Alan Morrison observed at the end of the Reagan years that the
outgoing President had “largely succeeded” in “placing in all agencies,
independent and otherwise, those who believe firmly in the Reagan view
of government—Democrats as well as Republicans.”57 And Senator Bob
Dole once accused President Clinton of appointing “Clinton
Republicans” to cross-party seats.58
We know of only one study other than our own that undertakes a
quantitative cross-commission analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies: the 1964 study by Stuart
Nagel and Martin Lubin referenced above. Nagel and Lubin focus on
seven commissions: the now-defunct Civil Aeronautics Board and
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the FCC, the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)),
the FTC, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the SEC.59
They draw data from three years each spaced a decade apart: 1936, 1946,
and 1956.60 They consider a decision to be “liberal” if it goes “in favor of
the consumer, shipper, or investor (rather than the seller, producer,
transporter, or broker), in favor of labor (rather than management), in
favor of a small business or increased competition (rather than a larger
firm or decreased competition).”61 They compare each commissioner’s
liberalism score with her agency’s average liberalism score. On this
dimension, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents are most
likely to be above their agency’s average liberalism score (64%), followed
by Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents (54%), followed by
Republicans appointed by Democratic Presidents (46%), followed by
Republicans appointed by Republican Presidents (33%).62 The findings
are reported in a way that makes it impossible to determine just how
55. See Staff of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission (1949–1974), at 357 (Comm. Print 1976).
56. Id. at 366.
57. Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory Agencies?,
1988 Duke L.J. 252, 253–54.
58. Al Kamen, Who’s Republican? And Who’s to Decide?, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 1993),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/06/whos-republican-andwhos-to-decide/8a85544f-f1a1-4558-ac1f-5c498e5609e6/?utm_term=.a10e33cb8cfe (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
59. Nagel & Lubin, supra note 5, at 39.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 40.
62. Id. at 42 tbl.1.
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much PBRs affect voting behavior, though the results seem to suggest
that PBRs lead Republican Presidents to choose somewhat more liberal
commissioners and lead Democratic Presidents to select somewhat more
conservative commissioners.
While these results are suggestive, Nagel and Lubin’s method of
categorizing decisions as “liberal” and “conservative” is certainly
vulnerable to critique. First, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are
not easy to operationalize—and any attempt to do so inevitably imports
biases. (Why do we think liberals are more likely to favor “increased
competition,” and how should we code cases in which the competitive
consequences are hotly disputed?) Second, the types of cases that will
reach an adjudicatory commission may vary with the commission’s
ideological composition—the administrative law version of the PriestKlein effect familiar from the civil procedure literature.63 Individual
workers and labor unions may be more likely to bring ambitious cases to
the NLRB when they know that the Board has a liberal majority; likewise
for employers when they know that the board tilts toward the right.
Professor Daniel Ho’s methodologically rigorous study of voting
patterns among FCC commissioners addresses the first of these two
aforementioned imperfections of the Nagel and Lubin study. Ho
pioneers an approach—a Bayesian multilevel ideal point model of mixed
ordinal votes—to map votes onto a unidimensional spectrum without
requiring researchers to decide which positions are “liberal” and which
are “conservative.”64 As Ho summarizes, his analysis of the FCC suggests
that most cross-party appointees are “genuine”: With a small number of
exceptions, “[c]ross-party appointees don’t don sheep’s clothing.”65 In
other words, Democratic commissioners appointed by Republican
Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR appear to be relatively liberal, and
Republican commissioners appointed by Democratic Presidents to satisfy
the statutory PBR appear to be relatively conservative. Somewhat
surprisingly, the most conservative commissioner according to Ho’s
estimates is a Republican appointed by Democratic President Clinton,
and the three most liberal commissioners are Democrats appointed by
Republican Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W.
Bush.66
Ho’s study of the FCC provides us with extraordinarily useful
insights regarding voting behavior at a single agency. But while Ho’s
single-agency analysis suggests that partisan balance requirements do
“bite,” it is not clear whether his FCC-specific results are generalizable to
63. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 14–18 (1984) (suggesting the disputes that reach litigation are ones in
which each party has close to a 50% probability of victory).
64. Ho, supra note 3, at 14–16.
65. Id. at 19, 24.
66. Id. at 21 fig.4.
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other multimember agencies.67 Unfortunately, Ho’s innovative method
cannot be applied broadly beyond the FCC: His method relies on having
a large set of nonunanimous commission votes to analyze, but at many
multimember agencies—including the FEC, FTC, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and SEC—dissents and concurrences are rare.68 For
this reason, we look to other data sources and methodological
approaches in order to assess the cross-agency effects of PBRs.
Ho’s study also does not seek to determine why PBRs might be effective. The next section turns to that question and sets forth two theories
with testable implications that might explain the efficacy of these provisions. Part II goes on to consider whether PBRs do in fact affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies and assess the evidence in
support of the two separate theories.
C.

Why Might Partisan Balance Requirements Bite?

We focus here on two causal mechanisms that might explain why
PBRs affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a
supply-side theory and a demand-side theory. In the “market” for
commissioners, the President draws from a limited supply of individuals
with the experience and expertise to serve competently on multimember
federal agencies. The President then must “sell” the nominee to
sometimes-skeptical senators—the consumers in our market metaphor. If
PBRs do indeed affect the ideological composition of multimember
agencies, it may be due to supply-side constraints, or demand-side
constraints, or both.
1. The Supply-Side Theory. — The supply-side theory holds that the
President selects from a pool of potential cross-party appointees that is
dominated by individuals whose ideological preferences differ from the
President’s own. Consider the challenge facing a Democratic President
who is filling a seat on the five-member FCC at a time when the FCC already has three Democratic members (its maximum number of sameparty commissioners). Presumably the President cares at least somewhat
about the competence of commissioners and so desires an appointee
67. The FCC is, by many accounts, a particularly politicized agency. See Benjamin
Kapnik, Affirming the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency Adjudications, 80 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1527, 1528 (2012) (“The FCC has long been considered a politicized
agency . . . .”); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of
the Administrative State, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 675, 689 (2009) (noting the “superpoliticized” environment at the FCC); cf. Kimberly A. Zarkin & Michael J. Zarkin, The
Federal Communications Commission: Front Line in the Culture and Regulation Wars 49
(2006) (“[T]he FCC is an organization that is particularly open to interference by outside
forces.”). While these characterizations are difficult to verify, they cast doubt on the
external validity of FCC-specific findings.
68. See Ho, supra note 3, at 8 tbl.1 (showing that the number of dissents and
concurrences per commissioner is 172 for the FCC, compared to four for the FEC, twelve
for the FTC, three for the NRC, and six for the SEC).
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with relevant experience in communications law or policy. The pool of
individuals who have such experience and who are not members of the
Democratic Party will be weighted toward moderates and conservatives.
While it might not be impossible for the Democratic President to find a
liberal non-Democrat who also has relevant qualifications for the
commissionership, it is—at the very least—easier for a Democratic
President to draw liberals from within the President’s own party than
from without.
The plausibility of the supply-side theory depends on the strength of
the relationship between partisanship and ideology. If the Republican
Party includes large pools of liberals as well as conservatives, then a
Democratic President making a cross-party appointment can satisfy the
PBR by selecting a relatively liberal Republican. Partisan sort, however,
undermines the ability of Democratic Presidents to find ideologically
sympathetic Republicans to fill posts on multimember agencies (and
likewise for Republican Presidents seeking out ideologically sympathetic
Democrats).
The political science literature on partisan sort distinguishes
between “elite polarization” and “mass polarization.” By “elites” (or
alternatively, the “political class”), we refer to public officials, interest
group leaders, activists, substantial donors, and political commentators.69
While the extent to which mass polarization has occurred is contested,70
there is close to a consensus that elites have become more polarized over
the course of the past several decades.71 Because appointees to
multimember agencies are generally drawn from the “political class,”72
elite polarization rather than mass polarization is the more relevant
phenomenon for our purposes. By most measures, the partisan sorting of
elites accelerated in the mid- to late-1970s and has continued to pick up
69. See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class
Versus the People, in 1 Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of America’s
Polarized Parties 49, 50 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (describing various
constituencies in the “political class” and the existence of significant differences in
political views within this group).
70. Compare Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the
U.S. Electorate, 60 J. Pol. 634, 649 (1998) (finding that “increasing ideological
polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties in the Reagan and post-Reagan
eras made it easier for voters to recognize the differences between the parties’ policy
stands” and choose “their party identification” based on policy preferences rather than
strict party allegiance), with Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope,
Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. Pol. 556, 558
(2008) (stating that “party sorting has proceeded much less in the general public than
among party elites”).
71. See Fiorina et al., supra note 70, at 557 (“There is general agreement that party
elites have become significantly more distinct over the course of the past several
decades . . . .”).
72. See infra note 108 (looking at the propensity of PBR appointees to contribute to
political candidates and finding that the “ideological distribution of bureaucratic
appointments broadly reflects the president’s preferences”).

2018]

PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE

27

steam ever since.73 On most accounts, the partisan realignment of the
South—with white conservative Democrats moving to the Republican
Party—was an important but nonexclusive factor contributing to partisan
sort.74 Whatever the causes, few scholars would dispute that ideology is a
stronger predictor of partisan affiliation today than it was twenty-five to
thirty-five years ago.75
The following figure provides one window on this partisan sort. The
figure uses DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates—estimates of legislators’ ideological preferences based on their roll call voting records—to
track partisan sort over the past fifty years.76 The solid red line charts the
median Republican House member’s ideal point from 1963 (close to the
nadir of polarization in the twentieth century) through 2013; the dotted
light blue and dashed dark blue lines report those values for the median
southern and non-southern Democratic representative, respectively. The
figure illustrates two reasons why partisan sort has occurred: (1) the
Republican Party became more conservative over a half century; and (2)
southern (but not northern) Democrats became more liberal.77 The

73. See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary
American Politics, 46 Polity 411, 415 (2014) (observing—on the basis of voting patterns
among members of the House and Senate—that “the parties began to diverge in the mid1970s and this trend has continued unabated into the most recent Congress”); Marc J.
Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 619, 622–23 (2001) (observing—also on the basis of congressional voting
patterns—that polarization reached a “trough” in the mid-1970s but began a “steady rise”
starting with the Carter years and a “second spike” in the last two years of George H.W.
Bush’s presidency).
74. See Hare & Poole, supra note 73, at 417 (“[T]he southern realignment does not
fully account for the increase in polarization. The Republican Party became much more
conservative across all regions of the United States.”); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan
Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 Presidential Stud. Q. 688, 691
(2013) (stating that the “main source” of polarization was “the partisan realignment of the
South” but noting that “[c]onservative whites outside the South also moved toward the
Republican Party, while liberals became overwhelmingly Democratic”).
75. See, e.g., Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. Pol. 1, 3
(2009) (explaining that “changes have given way to an electorate that is more strongly
driven by liberal/conservative ideological concerns” today).
76. These data were derived from Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE Congresses
1–113, Voteview (Mar. 23, 2015), http://legacy.voteview.com/pmediant.htm [http://
perma.cc/3Y52-E74N]. DW-NOMINATE arranges legislators on a -1 to 1 scale based on
their roll call voting records, placing legislators with similar voting records close together
on the scale. Id. The measure does not consider the content of the roll call votes. Id. Once
the algorithm is run for a large set of votes, the optimal placement of legislators along with
scale makes it obvious to any political observer that legislators placed near -1 are very
liberal and those placed near 1 are very conservative. See Keith T. Poole & Howard
Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting 23–24 (2000).
77. As the figure shows, the trend toward polarization is asymmetric, with greater
movement away from the middle among Republicans than among Democrats. For further
discussion, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America:
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 11 (2006) (noting that “Republicans in the
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latter phenomenon is attributable to the fact that a large number of
white conservatives in the South have changed their party affiliation from
Democratic to Republican, leaving a more liberal and largely African
American Democratic Party in southern states.78
FIGURE 1: PARTY POLARIZATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Figure 2 provides another perspective on partisan sort. It shows the
gap in DW-NOMINATE scores for the median Democratic and Republican
members of the House between 1963 and 2013. The takeaway from
Figures 1 and 2 is clear: The parties have become more ideologically
distinct over the past fifty years. The increase has been nearly monotonic,
with polarization accelerating in the second half of this period.

North and South have moved sharply to the right,” while “Northern Democrats . . . don’t
look sharply different from the Democrats of old”).
78. See Nelson W. Polsby, How Congress Evolves 151 (2005).
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FIGURE 2: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE HOUSE

The phenomenon of partisan sort has clear implications for the
ideological composition of multimember agencies subject to PBRs. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when both parties remained relatively
ideologically heterogeneous at the elite level, one might expect the effect
of PBRs on ideological composition to be muted. A Democratic
President making a cross-party appointment would not be forced to
choose from among conservatives; likewise, a Republican President
would likely be able to find qualified Democrats who were not liberals.
But as partisan sort accelerated over the last two decades of the twentieth
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, one might expect
the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to grow stronger. That is,
insofar as supply-side constraints account for the effect of PBRs on the
ideological composition of multimember agencies, one might expect
that effect to increase as supply-side constraints become more binding.
Accordingly, one way to assess the plausibility of the supply-side
theory is to look at whether the effect of PBRs on the ideological
composition of multimember agencies has increased over time. If it has,
then that finding would place the supply-side theory on firmer footing.
Further discussion of this point is deferred until Part II, which explains
tests conducted to determine whether the effect of PBRs on ideological
composition is temporally dependent. But first, section I.C.2 considers
whether PBRs might affect ideological composition through an
alternative causal mechanism.
2. The Demand-Side Theory. — Once a President has selected a
nominee for an agency post, she must “sell” that nominee to the Senate.
The confirmation hurdle imposes a potential demand-side constraint on
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the President’s ability to stock multimember agencies with ideologically
sympathetic appointees. Senators from the opposition party may use
what leverage they have to ensure that the President selects a “bona fide”
member of the opposition party when a PBR forces a cross-party
appointment.79 To satisfy senators—the “consumers” in the market
metaphor—the President may have to honor the spirit of PBRs when
choosing cross-party commissioners.
Insofar as demand-side constraints compel Democratic Presidents to
choose conservative Republican commissioners and Republican Presidents
to name liberal Democrats, one might expect these constraints to be most
binding under conditions of divided government. Presumably, the
Senate is more likely to stop a Democratic President from appointing a
liberal Republican to satisfy a PBR when the Senate is Republicancontrolled than when the Democrats have a majority (and vice versa
when it is a Republican President seeking to place a conservative
Democrat on a commission). To be sure, even a minority opposition
party in the Senate has historically been able to stop a nominee from
being confirmed through the filibuster, provided that it could muster
forty-one votes. But with the abolition of the filibuster for agency
nominees in November 2013,80 the minority party in the Senate no
longer has this weapon in its arsenal.
The demand-side theory, like the supply-side theory, leads us to expect that the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of
multimember agencies would vary across time. In particular, we might
expect the effect to be strongest when the White House and Senate are
controlled by different parties, such that the Senate can easily block a
cross-party appointee who is ideologically sympathetic to the President.
We might also expect the effect to be especially weak in the few periods
when the President’s party has held a filibuster-proof Senate majority.
Our dataset encompasses two such periods—both under President
Obama. First, the Democrats held sixty Senate seats from July 2009 (after
Democrat Al Franken was sworn in as senator from Minnesota81) until
January 2010 (when the Democrats lost a Senate seat from Massachusetts

79. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 488 (2008)
(“[O]pposition Senators regularly use holds and other delaying strategies to pressure the
President to appoint party loyalists to slots held by opposition-party members.”).
80. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most
Filibusters on Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-ofprecedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
81. See Mark Zdechlik, Franken Brings 60th Vote to Senate Dems, Minn. Pub.
Radio (July 1, 2009), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/07/01/franken60 [http://
perma.cc/K8FR-MWCU].
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following Republican Scott Brown’s victory in a special election82). And
second, after the Senate eliminated the filibuster for confirmation votes
on nominees to non-Supreme Court appointments in November 2013,
the Democrats retained a narrow majority until January 2015 (55-45,
including two independents who caucused with the Democrats).
The next Part examines whether PBRs do indeed affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies—and, if so, why. Our
approach allows us to test both the supply-side and demand-side theories,
and to reach tentative conclusions as to why PBRs might have real-world
consequences.
II. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS
This Part presents an empirical analysis of the effect of partisan balance requirements on the ideological composition of multimember
agencies. Section II.A describes our data and explains our research
design. Section II.B presents initial results. Section II.C considers supplyside and demand-side explanations for the efficacy of PBRs.
A.

Data and Research Design

To explore the relationship between the partisan and ideological
outlooks of appointees to agencies with partisan balance requirements
(PBR agencies), we first must define the population of PBR agencies.
Then, we must identify both the partisan identification and ideological
orientation for each appointee to these PBR agencies. This section
details our process for collecting data on (1) PBR agencies, (2)
appointee partisanship, and (3) appointee ideology.
1. Agencies with Partisan Balance Requirements. — PBR agencies share
one essential attribute: a restriction, grounded in statute or a deeply entrenched norm, on the number of individuals from the same political
party that may be appointed to the agency’s multimember governing
board. We examined appointments to twenty-three agencies83 that meet
this definition and that were in existence between 1979 and 2014.84
82. See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
83. These twenty-three PBR agencies are: the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), Farm Credit Administration (FCA), Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), National
Mediation Board (NMB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Securities and
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With the exception of the NLRB, these agencies’ PBRs are imposed
by statute.85 (We classify the NLRB as a PBR agency based on a firmly
entrenched norm favoring partisan balance on that body.86) The
structural features of these agencies vary considerably. Table 1 reports
the presence or absence of design features in these agencies that, along
with PBRs, are commonly considered to be indicia of agency
independence.87
For-cause removal protection prevents the President from removing
an appointee at will, requiring that the President show cause to do so before the expiration of the appointee’s term.88 For instance, FTC commissioners may be removed only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”89 Fixed terms in office further insulate appointees
Exchange Commission (SEC), Surface Transportation Board (STB, formerly the Interstate
Commerce Commission), and U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC).
84. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89; George A. Krause & Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of
the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments
(2015)
[hereinafter
Krause
&
O’Connell,
Replication
Data],
http://
dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681304&version=RELEASED&version=.2 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); David C. Nixon, The Independent Regulatory
Commissioner Data Base, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/index.htm [http://
perma.cc/XK2Y-2E2B] (last updated Mar. 10, 2005).
85. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012) (mandating that the EEOC “be
composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same
political party”).
86. See infra notes 127–131 and accompanying text.
87. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 18 (2010) (outlining some of the design features
that act as “more robust checks against agency capture under asymmetrical political
conditions than the use of traditional factors alone”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784
& n.89. An agency’s multimember structure is another common feature of independent
agencies. See Barkow, supra, at 17; Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 792–97. Because all
PBR agencies are by definition headed by multiple members, Table 1 omits this feature.
Among these twenty-three agencies, the NMB is an outlier in two respects. First, its power
to bind outside parties is limited. The NMB can compel railroads or airlines and their
employees to arbitrate labor disputes if certain conditions are met; if one party refuses to
arbitrate, the NMB can authorize a labor strike or a lockout by management. 45 U.S.C.
§ 155 (2012). Second, its structure includes only three indicia of independence: fixed
terms, PBRs, and multimember boards. Nonetheless, we think the NMB deserves
inclusion. Given the historical significance of labor disputes in the railroad industry and
the importance of the transportation sector to the national economy, the NMB’s powers,
though limited, are nontrivial. See generally Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations
(2014). Further, fixed terms and PBRs—both of which the NMB has—are considered
particularly important indicia of independence. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and
Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 259. Nonetheless, excluding the
NMB from our analysis does not materially change the results.
88. See Barkow, supra note 87, at 27.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
627–32 (1935). However, neither Congress nor the courts have defined these broad terms
constituting good cause, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), which raises the
possibility that removal protections would not constrain a motivated President. See
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to PBR agencies from the White House and thus provide a second indicium of agency independence.90 The ability to pursue litigation
independent of the Justice Department (litigation authority); bypass
centralized OMB review and submit budgets directly to Congress (bypass
authority”); and craft policy through formal adjudication, which is less
susceptible to political interference than rulemaking (adjudication
authority), all foster agency independence as well.91 Finally, qualification
requirements—for example, that members of the NTSB possess
transportation-safety-related professional credentials and experience92—
constrain the President’s hand in appointments.93

Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 110–11 (1994) (discussing the vagueness of the statute’s reference to “good cause”
and how the President could use this to retain “a large degree of removal and supervisory
power”).
90. See Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States 15 (1989) (explaining how fixed terms for appointees to PBR agencies can separate
them from “presidential influence”).
91. Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 799–804 (discussing litigation authority); id. at
804–08 (discussing bypass authority); id. at 808–12 (discussing adjudication authority).
92. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012).
93. See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J.
Pol. 1095, 1098–99 (2002). We exclude U.S. citizenship requirements, which impose de
minimis constraints on appointments, from our classification of qualification
requirements.
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94. See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RL33886, Statutory Qualifications for
Executive Branch Positions 26–30 tbl.A-2 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL33886.pdf [http://perma.cc/C572-XUD7] (identifying agencies with qualification
requirements); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 786 tbl.1 (identifying agencies with
statutory removal protection); id. at 790 tbl.2 (identifying agencies with fixed terms); id. at
800 tbl.5 (identifying agencies with litigation authority); id. at 804 tbl.6 (identifying
agencies with bypass authority); id. at 809 tbl.7 (identifying agencies with adjudication
authority).
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As Table 1 shows, these agencies vary considerably in terms of their
particular mix of most of the other indicia of independence—except for
the fact that all PBR agencies also feature statutorily mandated fixed
terms for their commissioners or board members. That feature is
remarkably common; among all executive agencies that are typically
classified as independent, only three relatively minor agencies do not
require set terms for their leaders.95
2. Appointee Party Identification. — Having identified the set of PBR
agencies for this study, we turn to determining the partisan affiliations of
appointees to these agencies. For eleven agencies (the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), EEOC, FCC, FEC, FERC, FTC,
NLRB, NTSB, NRC, SEC, and Surface Transportation Board (STB)), we
obtained the name, date of nomination, and partisan identification for
each individual appointed between 1979 and 2008 from an executiveappointee biographical dataset compiled by Professors George Krause
and Anne Joseph O’Connell.96 We then extended this analysis through
95. Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 790 tbl.2 (listing the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and U.S. Agency for International
Development as the only currently existing independent agencies without specified tenure
for appointees).
96. See Krause & O’Connell, Replication Data, supra note 84. Krause and
O’Connell’s dataset reports whether each appointee “has [the] same or strongly
presumed partisan affiliation as [the] appointing president.” See Anne Joseph O’Connell
& George A. Krause, Variable Codebook for Manuscript & Supporting Information
Document (2015), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681274&version=1.2
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also George A. Krause & Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Compliance, Competence, and Bureaucratic Leadership in U.S. Federal
Government Agencies: A Bayesian Generalized Latent Trait Analysis 6–7 (Sept. 19,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9f96/d968768c293
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2014 via Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports containing the
same information for appointments made between 2000 and 2014.97 To
assess the reliability of both data sources, we examined the extent to
which the two sources include identical information for appointees
during the period from 2002 to 2008 for which the two sources overlap.
Inter-observer reliability between the two data sources is extremely high;
the appointee names, nomination dates, and partisan affiliations
reported in the two sources in this period were identical.
For the other twelve agencies, we built an original dataset that includes the name, date of nomination, and party affiliation for each individual appointed as a board member or commissioner from 1979
through 1999. We drew information on name and date of nomination
from congressional records and determined partisan identifications from
a variety of other sources, including newspaper reports around the time
of nomination and obituaries of now-deceased appointees. Once again,
we extended this analysis through 2014 via CRS reports.
3. Appointee Ideology. — Finally, we employ the Database on Ideology,
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) to determine the ideological
preferences of each appointee.98 Developed by Adam Bonica, DIME contains over 130 million political contributions made by 14.7 million
individuals and 1.7 million organizations to over 80,000 political action
committees and candidates in federal, state, and local elections between
1979 and 2014.99 DIME leverages these data to generate ideology-based

aad47539d38d2a0a977aa85a6.pdf?-_ga=2.225073178.1651911087.15054242832085157714.
1505424283 [http://perma.cc/CB5E-MQMR] (describing the database).
97. See generally Michael Greene, Cong. Research Serv., R43893, Presidential
Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and
Commissions, 112th Congress (2015); Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., R43238,
Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial
Boards and Commissions, 111th Congress (2013); Henry B. Hogue & Maureen Bearden,
Cong. Research Serv., R41463, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on
Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 110th Congress (2010); Henry
Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL34744, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time
Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 109th Congress
(2009); Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL32742, Presidential Appointments to
Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 108th
Congress (2005); Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RL30910, Presidential
Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and
Commissions, 107th Congress (2003); Rogelio Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 30476,
Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial
Boards and Commissions, 106th Congress (2001). We excluded from our analysis the nine
appointees whom the CRS Reports classified as “independent.”
98. Adam Bonica, Codebook for the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME) (Version 2.0) (2016) [hereinafter Bonica, Codebook for DIME],
http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865308&version=2.2 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
99. Id. at 3 (providing statistics for the most recent update to DIME). Contribution
data are derived from the FEC and several good-government organizations. See Bonica,
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scores, referred to as Campaign Finance Scores (CFscores), for all donors
and recipients during this period.100
The intuition behind DIME is simple: Individuals’ decisions to contribute to political campaigns constitute revealed preferences concerning
their political views.101 The destination and amount of an individual’s
campaign contributions disclose information regarding that individual’s
ideological “ideal point.” DIME’s algorithm uses this information on all
of an individual’s donations between 1979 and 2014 to place donors
along a scale based on their history of campaign contributions.102 The

Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370 (explaining where the records comprising
the databases were collected from).
100. The use of spatial scores to measure the preferences of political actors is well
established in political science. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 368.
Their application to legal scholarship has become increasingly common in recent years.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President,
45 J. Legal Stud. 401, 408–11 (2016) (using statistical analysis of voting by Supreme Court
Justices to demonstrate a “loyalty effect” that suggests Justices feel “personal loyalty to the
president” that appointed her or him, “not loyalty to the groups (like parties) or ideas
(like the Constitution)”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev.
1903, 1905–07 (2012) (using spatial scores analysis to identify issues in political
gerrymandering).
In particular, DIME’s CFscores have been employed or cited in a wide variety of
social-scientific and legal scholarship since their debut in 2013. See, e.g., Adam Bonica,
Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. Legal
Analysis 277, 279 (2016) (employing DIME data to explore the ideology of American
lawyers); Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of
Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 Election L.J. 302, 307–08 (2016) (using
DIME data to determine that campaign disclosure requirements had a negligible effect in
chilling speech and deterring political participation).
101. Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 367.
102. For a technical explanation of DIME’s estimation strategy, see id. at 369–70.
Essentially, DIME places donors along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the
distance between donors with similar patterns of political giving. DIME then places
recipients along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the distance between recipients
with similar donor pools. That some donors also are recipients provides a “bridge,”
enabling DIME to place donors and recipients on the same scale. Likewise, that some
donors contribute to both state and federal campaigns and that some recipients run for
both state and federal office provide additional bridge observations. These bridges enable
DIME to create a single ideological scale for a massive number of individuals across thirtysix years of politics. See Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure
of State Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. Econ. & Org. 472, 476–77 (2015) (presenting a
“method to construct ideological measures for state Supreme Court justices from
campaign finance records”). Bonica has subjected DIME to several tests to evaluate the
validity of the measure. Concerning the measure’s external validity, CFscores for members
of Congress correlate closely with the scores assigned to these legislators by DWNOMINATE, a well-established method of estimating legislators’ ideal points based on
their roll-call voting records. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370–
71 (reporting that r = 0.92 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates).
Concerning internal validity, for individuals that were active donors or recipients
throughout the period from 1979 to 2014, the static CFscores derived from their activity
during the entire period are closely correlated with CFscores derived from these
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scale ranges from -2 (assigned to the most liberal donors) to 2 (assigned
to the most conservative donors).103 The mean CFscore for donors is 0
and the standard deviation is 1.104
To obtain each appointee’s CFscore, we searched the DIME
project’s dataset on appointees to federal agencies,105 as well as the
project’s full database on all contributors to federal, state, and local
elections between 1979 and 2014.106 For individuals with common names
or names with multiple entries in the full database, we cross-checked the
individual’s profession, employer, and place of residence as reported in
DIME with the appointee’s biographical information available via online
sources—For example, biographical sketches on current employers’
websites, LinkedIn profiles, or obituaries—to determine whether the
individual located in DIME and the appointee were the same person.
This method yielded CFscores for 80% of appointees (578 of 722) to the
twenty-three PBR agencies107 we identified. This 80% match rate is
comparable to the success rates of similar studies that employ DIME to
determine the ideologies of members of other elite groups.108
Readers may wonder whether campaign contributions truly capture
donors’ political preferences. Donors may instead choose to give for a
range of strategic reasons—for example, to encourage the election of
politicians sympathetic to the donors’ business interests or to curry favor
with existing officeholders in exchange for access, votes, or other
services.109 This critique may seem particularly powerful for our research
individuals’ activity during select years within this range. See id. at 373 (reporting that R2 =
0.97 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates).
103. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 369.
104. Id.
105. Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology,
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (2015) [hereinafter Bonica, Executive
Appointees, DIME], http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/
DVN/O5PX0B [http://perma.cc/DKY4-HLEJ]; see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen & Tim
Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the
Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy, 10 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 5, 7
(2015) [hereinafter Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping] (using a “formal
model that examines how Senate committees and the presidential staffing of ‘inferior
offices’ affect the ideological distribution of appointed public bureaucrats”).
106. Bonica, Codebook for DIME, supra note 98.
107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
108. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives, 18 Bus. & Pol. 367, 375 (2016) (finding
an 83% match rate for Fortune 500 CEOs and board members); Adam Bonica, Adam S.
Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks,
19 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 96, 105 (2017) (reporting a 66% match rate for former Supreme
Court clerks); Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 20
(reporting a 72% match rate for a subset of appointees under Presidents Clinton and
George W. Bush).
109. See Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Consumption or
Investment? On Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. Pol. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing
donors’ varied potential motives).
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design, given that all donors in our sample actually did receive something
of value—an executive appointment—at some point during the thirty-sixyear period in which they made at least one campaign contribution. Our
response to this concern is twofold. First, we rely on a large body of
political science research finding that individuals make political
contributions sincerely—not strategically.110 Survey results indicate that
donors consider the recipient’s ideology to be the most important factor
when deciding whether to give, placing ideology far above more strategic
considerations such as electability, incumbent status, and ability to
influence the candidate.111 Accordingly, the dominant view among
political scientists considers campaign contributions as a form of
consumption among “political hobbyists” rather than an investment by
strategic actors.112 Second, insofar as a divergence between donors’
ideological preferences and the ideal points reflected by their campaign
contributions introduces measurement error into our analysis, we find it
hard to explain why such a divergence would account for the change
over time that we document in the next section. (Below we consider
whether the easy observability of campaign contributions in the Internet
age might affect our results, and we find strong evidence that it does
not.113)
B.

Results

1. Descriptive Statistics. — With these data on appointee ideology and
partisan identification in hand, we turn to analyzing the effects of PBRs
on the composition of agency leadership ranks. Table 2 provides an
overview of the appointees included in our data: 578 appointees to
twenty-three agencies over thirty-six years.

110. See, e.g., Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370; Michael J.
Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 Pub. Choice 221,
230 (2009); Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Commitment and the Campaign
Contribution Contract, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 872, 875–81 (1996).
111. See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and
Ideology, 69 Pol. Res. Q. 148, 154 & tbl.1 (2016).
112. See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is
There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 105, 105 (2003) (concluding
that campaign contributions are best understood not as political investment but as a type
of consumption good). See generally Eitan Hersh, Political Hobbyism: A Theory of Mass
Politics (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.eitanhersh.com/
uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_theory_of_hobbyism_v2.0.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that for many Americans, “political participation is not
appropriately described as motivated by duty, but is more akin to a hobby”).
113. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2: OVERVIEW APPOINTEES BY PRESIDENT

Co-Party Appointees

Cross-Party Appointees

Appointing President
Total
Appts.

Appts. per
Year

Total
Appts.

Appts. per
Year

All (1979–2014)

362

6.6

216

4.0

Democratic
Presidents

155

5.9

96

3.8

Republican
Presidents

207

7.2

120

4.3

Carter

11

5.5

9

4.5

Reagan

56

7.0

38

4.8

G.H.W. Bush

39

9.75

17

4.3

Clinton

75

9.4

48

6.0

G.W. Bush

112

14.0

65

8.2

Obama

69

11.5

39

6.5

n = 578. Includes appointees to twenty-three agencies from 1979 to 2014. Carter years
include 1979 to 1980 only; Obama years include 2009 to 2014 only.

Unsurprisingly, all Presidents during this period tended to appoint
their fellow party members to PBR agencies; 63% of appointees (362 of
578) belonged to the same party as the appointing President.114 This tilt
114. Interestingly, the proportion of appointees that share the President’s party label
almost perfectly mirrors the no-more-than-three-of-five requirement that is typical among
independent agencies. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 776.
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is not the result of Presidents disregarding PBR statutes.115 Rather, most
partisan balance statutes do not require perfect balance but permit a
bare majority of members to be affiliated with the same political party—
one possible explanation for the tilt.116 Another contributor to the
imbalance may be that co-partisan appointees strategically retire before
the end of their terms when a friendly President is in office (leading to
more openings for co-party slots during any given presidency).117 Table 3
contains descriptive statistics concerning the ideologies of appointees to
PBR agencies, arranged by President and by whether the appointee and
appointing President shared a partisan affiliation. For each President,
Table 3 also reports differences in the mean ideology of co-party versus
cross-party appointees.118

115. The imbalance was greatest during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who was
not known for his sharp partisan elbows. See Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The
American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush 390 (2015).
116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (mandating that no more than three out of
the five SEC commissioners be affiliated with the same party); id. § 2053(c) (mandating
that no more than three out of the five CPSC commissioners be affiliated with the same
party). But see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (Supp. II 2015) (requiring exact partisan
balance on the FEC).
117. Cf. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 37 (2005) (summarizing studies showing that appellate judges strategically
time their retirements to increase the likelihood that like-minded successors will replace
them).
Note that the number of appointees per year who appear in DIME is somewhat lower
for the Carter and Reagan Administrations than for later presidencies. We attribute this
trend to three factors. First, public disclosure of federal campaign contributions did not
begin until 1972, and DIME’s coverage starts in 1979. See Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 304, 86 Stat. 3, 14–15 (1972) (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 30104). Thus, Carter and Reagan appointees who made their last campaign
contributions before the late 1970s will generally not appear in DIME. Second, the $200
reporting threshold has not changed since 1980, despite intervening inflation. See Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, sec. 104, § 10(b)(3), 93
Stat. 1339, 1352 (1980) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Individuals who made
campaign contributions in more recent years thus are more likely to exceed the threshold
and trigger a public disclosure. Finally, one agency was established partway through the
period from 1979 to 2014, resulting in a small increase in the number of positions to be
filled. See National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456,
§ 1441(a), 102 Stat. 1918, 2076 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2286 (2012))
(establishing the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board). Excluding the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board from the analysis does not materially alter any of our results.
118. The final column in Table 3 reports the p value for a series of two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for differences in distributions. Low p values counsel in
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis that the distribution of CFscores for co-party
appointees and the distribution of CFscores for cross-party appointees were drawn from
the same underlying distribution. All of the reported p values meet—and, for all but the
Carter appointees, far exceed—the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 threshold for
statistical significance.
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TABLE 3: APPOINTEE IDEOLOGY, BY PRESIDENT

Appointing
President

Mean CFscore
(Standard Deviation)

Diff. in
Means119
(95%
Conf.
Interval)

KS Test p-value

Co-Party
Appointees

CrossParty
Appointees

Democratic
Presidents

-0.913
(0.521)

0.774
(0.535)

1.687
(1.549,
1.826)

0.000

Republican
Presidents

0. 848
(0.368)

-0.492
(0.808)

1.340
(1.182,
1.497)

0.000

Carter

-0.494
(0.749)

0.301
(0.828)

0.795
(0.011,
1.601)

0.047

Reagan

0.797
(0.539)

-0.005
(0.794)

0.802
(0.496,
1.108)

0.000

G.H.W. Bush

0.846
(0.422)

-0.162
(0.900)

1.008
(0.497,
1.520)

0.000

Clinton

-0.875
(0.408)

0.747
(0.494)

1.622
(1.447,
1.798)

0.000

G.W. Bush

0.873
(0.213)

-0.830
(0.615)

1.703
(1.546,
1.861)

0.000

119. Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean
CFscore for co-party appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees.
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Mean CFscore
(Standard Deviation)

-1.015
(0.563)

0.902
(0.458)

Diff. in
Means120
(95% Conf.
Interval)

KS Test p-value

1.917
(1.719,
2.116)

0.000

n = 578. Includes appointees to twenty-three agencies from 1979 to 2014. Absolute
values of differences in means between co-party and cross-party appointees reported.
Differences in means calculated via Welch’s t-tests, appropriate for samples with
skewed distributions drawn from independent populations. Carter years include 1979
to 1980 only; Obama years include 2009 to 2014 only. During the entire period from
1979 to 2014, the mean CFscore for all appointees was 0.078 (sd = 0.961).

The key takeaway from Table 3 emerges from the column displaying
the difference in means between co-party and cross-party appointees.
During the Carter Administration, the point estimate for the ideological
gap between co-party and cross-party appointees to PBR agencies is
0.795, which indicates a modest ideological difference (less than one
standard deviation) between Carter’s co-party and cross-party
appointees.121 This gap grows steadily in subsequent administrations,
reaching 1.917 in the Obama years—almost two-and-one-half times the
size of the gap under Carter. The widening occurs over Democratic as
well as Republican administrations. Accordingly, at first glance the most
notable aspect of this difference is its growth over time, rather than its
association with any particular party or presidency.
2. Co-Party Versus Cross-Party Appointees. — What do the ideologies of
appointees to PBR agencies look like? More specifically, how do the views
of individuals appointed to Democratic seats by Democratic Presidents
differ from those appointed to Democratic seats by Republican
Presidents? And are the patterns similar for Republican appointees?
To answer these questions, Figure 3 compares the ideological distributions of all four categories of nominees. Democratic officials
appointed by Democratic Presidents appear in dark blue, whereas
Democrats appointed by Republicans appear in light blue; likewise,
Republicans appointed by Republicans appear in dark red, whereas
Republicans appointed by Democrats appear in light red. Because, for
120. Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean
CFscore for co-party appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees.
121. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 369 (stating that the mean
CFscore for donors is zero and the standard deviation is one).

44

[Vol. 118:9

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

this analysis, the focus is on recent appointment behavior, the figure is
limited to the period from 2000 to 2014.
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FIGURE 3: IDEOLOGIES OF APPOINTEES TO PBR AGENCIES, 2000–2014
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n = 347. Includes appointees made during the period from 2000 to 2014 to twentythree PBR agencies.

Figure 3 reveals a striking feature of recent appointments to PBR
agencies: Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents have views
virtually identical to those of Democrats appointed by Republican
Presidents, and the same holds true of Republican appointees. Presidents
Clinton and Obama did not name liberal Republicans to cross-party
positions on PBR agencies; neither did President George W. Bush
appoint conservative Democrats to cross-party seats. Instead, recent
Presidents abided by the spirit of PBRs in those agencies’ organic
statutes.
Presidents’ willingness to appoint their ideological opponents to
cross-party seats appears to be a recent development. The following
several figures compare the ideologies of co-party and cross-party
appointees beginning in 1979. Figure 4(a) displays the ideological
distance between the CFscore of the appointing President and the mean
CFscore of that President’s appointees to PBR agencies. For a
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Democratic President, a negative value indicates that the mean
appointee is more liberal than the appointing President, and a positive
value indicates that the mean appointee is more conservative. For a
Republican President, the reverse is true: Negative values indicate that
the mean appointee is more conservative than the appointing President,
and positive values indicate that the appointee is more liberal. Figure
4(b) reports similar information by year. The bars emanating from the
point estimates in both figures denote one standard deviation in each
direction from the relevant mean.

2
1
0
-1

Difference in CFscore Between Appointing
President & Appointee

3

FIGURE 4(A): IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN APPOINTEES TO PBR
AGENCIES AND THEIR APPOINTING PRESIDENTS

Carter

Reagan

G.H.W. Bush

Clinton

G.W. Bush

Obama

President
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between
appointees’ CFscore and the appointing President’s CFscore. The solid circles
represent the mean CFscore for co-party appointees, whereas the solid triangles
represent the mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. Positive values for appointees
in a Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one
standard deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is
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standardized to y = 0. Carter years include 1979 to 1980 only; Obama years include
2009 to 2014 only.
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1
0
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Difference in CFscore Between Appointing
President & Appointee

3

FIGURE 4(B): IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN APPOINTEES TO PBR
AGENCIES AND THEIR APPOINTING PRESIDENTS, BY YEAR

1981

1985

1989

1993

1997

2001

2005

2009

2013

Year
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between
appointees’ CFscore and the appointing President’s CFscore. The solid circles
represent the mean CFscore for co-party appointees, whereas the solid triangles
represent the mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. Positive values for appointees
in a Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one
standard deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is
standardized to y = 0.

The point estimates for Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that cross-party
appointees are more conservative than co-party appointees across all
Democratic administrations and more liberal than co-party appointees in
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all Republican administrations. This gap increases, in fits and spurts,
throughout the period of study. During the Carter Administration, for instance, the CFscore for the mean appointee to a Democratic seat was
0.159 points to the left of President Carter’s CFscore, whereas the mean
appointee to a Republican seat had a CFscore that was 0.636 points to
the right of President Carter—a gap of 0.795 points. By the Obama
Administration, the mean Democratic appointee was 0.637 points to the
right of President Obama, while the mean Republican appointee was
2.471 points to the right of President Obama—a gap of 1.834 points. In
other words, the ideological gap between co-party and cross-party
appointees within the same party widened over time.
The associated standard deviations in both figures provide further
support for this finding. In Figure 4(a), the standard deviation bars for
co-party and cross-party appointees overlap during the Carter, Reagan,
and George H.W. Bush Administrations, indicating that a sizable number
of co-party and cross-party appointees are ideologically similar. The bars
then pull apart in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama years,
signifying significantly less ideological overlap between co-party and
cross-party appointees during these presidencies. The standard deviation
bars in Figure 4(b) tell a similar story.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) appear to demonstrate a time trend, with the
ideological distance between cross-party appointees and their appointing
President increasing over time. Figure 5, below, provides a better sense of
this time trend. The figure plots the difference in ideological score between the appointing President and cross-party appointees over the
thirty-six-year study period and includes a linear regression line. The
positive slope suggests the presence of a trend component.

2.0
2.5
1.5
1

CFscore Difference Between Appointing
President & Cross-Party Appointee

FIGURE 5: TIME TREND IN IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE
APPOINTING PRESIDENT AND CROSS-PARTY APPOINTEES
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The supply-side theory suggests that we should observe steady
growth in the ideological gap between cross-party appointees and their
appointing President over time, consistent with the pattern of partisan
sort shown in Figure 2. By contrast, the supply-side theory gives us no
reason to expect any similar changes over time in the gap between coparty appointees and their appointing President. None of the six
Presidents in our study period (Carter through Obama) exhibited
ideological preferences that were radically out of step with the
mainstream of his own party. Accordingly, we would expect these
Presidents to be able to find co-partisans whose views roughly matched
their own. Visually, Figures 4 and 5 align with the supply-side theory’s
predictions: Cross-party appointees have grown further apart from the
appointing President, while co-party appointees have not.
3. Ideological Consistency. — Our analysis thus far treats appointees’
ideologies as time-invariant. The DIME master database assigns each
donor a single CFscore based on that individual’s total contributions
during the period from 1979 to 2014, and we adopt this measure as a
proxy for ideology in the analysis above. Yet we are mindful that
individuals may evolve in their thinking, or that they may donate
strategically prior to their appointment so as to send a signal of ideology
that differs from their true preferences. Fortunately, the available data
allow us to observe whether donation patterns change post-appointment
in ways that would suggest either ideological drift or strategic giving.
Although ideological self-categorization is stable for most people
throughout their lives,122 it may be less consistent among members of the
political class from which appointees are drawn. The notion that elite actors display ideological fluidity over their careers is familiar to students of
judicial behavior. Observers of the Supreme Court have pointed to a socalled “Greenhouse effect”—a trend of Supreme Court Justices “drift[ing]
away from the conservatism of their early votes” and toward the more
liberal preferences of “cultural elites.”123 While the Greenhouse effect
generally refers to the evolution of appointees’ sincere preferences over
time, a related possibility is that prospective appointees may misrepresent
their preferences prior to confirmation and then reveal their true selves

122. Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist & Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts & Minds:
Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters 28 (2002).
123. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1518 (2010). The “Greenhouse” in question
is Linda Greenhouse, the longtime Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times.
The term can be traced back to a 1992 speech by Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan
appointee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who claimed that
Greenhouse’s reporting pressured Justices to take more liberal stances in order to garner
favorable coverage from the Times. See Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned by a Federal
Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. Times (June 15, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/
06/15/us/press-is-condemned-by-a-federal-judge-for-court-coverage.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).

2018]

PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE

49

after they are sworn in.124 For example, a Democratic President may
“sell” a nominee to the Senate as a genuine Republican, but the
individual may turn out to be—after confirmation—a liberal who
registered as a Republican and donated to conservative candidates for
the purpose of positioning himself for a potential cross-party
appointment. To return to our market metaphor, a potential appointee
who looks like a peach from the opposition party’s perspective may turn
out to be a lemon—and consumers (here, senators) have incomplete
information regarding which nominees fall into which of these
categories until after the transaction.
To test the ideological consistency of appointees over time, we examined the donation patterns of commissioners in the eight years before
and after their initial appointments. We looked at commissioners’ cyclespecific scores derived from the biennial DIME contribution datasets,
which include CFscores for donors in each two-year election cycle.125
Naturally, these files are less comprehensive than the DIME master
database for the period from 1979 to 2014; to be included in one of the
election cycle-specific files, an individual must donate to a sufficient
number of candidates or PACs to generate a CFscore for that cycle.
Creating cycle-specific scores enables us to chart commissioners’
ideal point estimates over time and identify any changes in behavior
around the time of their initial appointments. Here, we display results for
the FCC, which in several respects is the archetypical agency with a PBR:
The FCC has the modal number of commissioners (five), the modal term
length (five years), and, like many of the twenty-three agencies in our
study, was created during the New Deal era.
Figure 6 displays our results for both Democratic and Republican appointees selected by both Democratic and Republican Presidents. To
compare commissioners’ ideal point estimates before and after
appointment, the x axis in both figures denotes the number of years
since each commissioner was first appointed to the FCC (negative
numbers thus represent pre-appointment years).

124. On “stealth nominees” at the Supreme Court, see Michael Comiskey, The
Supreme Court Appointment Process: Lessons from Filling the Rehnquist and O’Connor
Vacancies, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 355, 357 (2008).
125. We thank Adam Bonica and Kyle Rozema for their assistance in this analysis.
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If liberals registered as Republicans and donated to conservative candidates so they could be sold by a Democratic President to Senate
Republicans as genuine cross-party appointees, then we would expect to
see the light red line (Democratic President, Republican appointee)
trending downward in later years, as appointees who posed as conservatives pre-confirmation revealed their true liberal selves. Likewise, if conservatives registered as Democrats and donated to liberal candidates so
they could be sold by a Republican President to Senate Democrats, then
we would expect to see the light blue line (Republican President,
Democratic appointee) trending upward in later years, as appointees
who posed as liberals revealed their true conservative selves. And if
appointees tended to drift in a single direction (a Greenhouse effect at
multimember agencies), then we would expect the lines to be roughly
parallel with similar slopes.
We observe none of these phenomena in Figure 6. For the most
part, commissioners display consistent ideologies over time. Concerning
those commissioners for whom we have ideal point estimates both before
and after their initial appointments, we see only slight, inconsistent
movement toward more extreme positions post-appointment.
4. PBR Agencies Versus the Rest of the Executive Branch. — To provide
broader context for this secular divergence in the ideological
composition of PBR agencies, we compare ideological preferences of
appointees to PBR agencies with the ideological preferences of other
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high-level executive branch policymakers.126 Placing PBR agency
appointees and other officeholders on the same scale allows us to assess
the extent to which the observed trend in PBR agencies reflects or
departs from changes in the ideological composition of executive
appointees writ large.
For this analysis, we leverage a dataset created by Professors Adam
Bonica, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson, which contains DIME-based
CFscores for all available executive appointees between the Reagan and
Obama Administrations.127 The solid curves in Figures 7(a)–(e) depict
the ideological distributions of PBR appointees across five presidential
administrations; the dashed curves depict these distributions for other
high-level, Senate-confirmed officials.128

126. High-level officials encompass heads and commissioners of other independent
agencies, department secretaries, and second- and third-level leaders (typically deputy
secretaries and assistant secretaries or undersecretaries) in executive departments. All
positions require Senate confirmation.
127. Bonica, Executive Appointees, DIME, supra note 105; see also Bonica, Chen &
Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 15. To allow for longitudinal
comparisons across the entire period, we exclude agencies that operated during only part
of this period, for example, the African Development Foundation, Corporation for
National and Community Service, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and U.S.
Information Agency.
128. Figures 7(a)–(e) were generated using the CFscores for 2,318 appointees.
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FIGURES 7(A)–(E): IDEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF APPOINTEES TO PBR
AGENCIES AND OTHER AGENCIES
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FIGURE 7(D): G.W. BUSH
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Figures 7(a) through 7(e) show a remarkable development. Figure
7(a) reports that during the Reagan Administration, the ideological
distribution of appointees to PBR agencies—including both co-party and
cross-party appointees—maps closely onto the ideological distribution of
high-level executive appointees. Both distributions are unimodal,
clustered around a conservative President’s own CFscore. Figure 7(b)
provides a similar picture for the George H.W. Bush Administration.
A change, however, is discernible in the Clinton years. Although
most Clinton appointees to both PBR agencies and other high-level
executive positions are clustered around the same left-of-center mode, a
right-of-center local maximum has begun to develop—but only for
appointees to PBR agencies. This bimodality becomes more pronounced
in the George W. Bush Administration (naturally, with the locations of
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the global and local maxima flipping, as the White House switches from
Democratic to Republican control). The trend continues in the Obama
Administration; by the Obama years, the distribution of appointees to
PBR agencies is almost completely bimodal, with a cluster of appointees
located approximately at -1 and a second cluster—only slightly smaller—
roughly centered around +1. By contrast, the distribution of other highlevel appointees remains single-peaked, with its mode located near
President Obama’s CFscore.
To translate these trends from picture to prose: Our findings suggest
that PBRs had very little effect on the ideological composition of
agencies during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. The
ideological distribution of PBR agency appointees closely matches the
distribution of appointees to positions not covered by PBRs. Starting with
the Clinton Administration, however, a distinct PBR effect appears.
President Clinton appointed a fair number of conservatives to PBR
agencies but named very few conservatives to other posts. The PBR effect
grows even more pronounced under President George W. Bush and
President Obama. These results confirm our thesis that PBRs do indeed
bite, but that they have come to bite only relatively recently.
5. Statutory Versus Informal PBRs. — Our analysis thus far has lumped
the NLRB with other PBR agencies, even though the NLRB is not subject
to a formal PBR. The House in 1947 passed legislation that would have
added a formal partisan balance requirement to the statute governing
NLRB membership, but the party balance provision was (for reasons not
explained in the legislative history129) omitted from the version of the bill
that passed the Senate and became law.130 Nonetheless, there has been a
“tradition” since the Eisenhower years that Presidents have filled no
more than three of the NLRB’s five seats with members of their own
party.131 The informal partisan balance requirement at the NLRB is an
example of what Professor Adrian Vermeuele has called a “convention of

129. H.R. Rep. No. 80-510, at 36–37 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) (noting the party balance
provision was included in the House bill but not in the conference agreement, and
offering no explanation for this omission).
130. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 101, § 3(a),
61 Stat. 136, 139.
131. See Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board: A
Review of the Recent Past, 22 J. Lab. Res. 699, 700 (2001) (discussing the unwritten
tradition of bipartisanship and restraint that characterized appointments to the NLRB);
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 Comp. Lab.
L. & Pol’y J. 221, 244 & n.109 (2005) (“Notwithstanding this silence, a tradition has
developed of appointing both Democrats and Republicans to the Board, with the
President’s party holding a three-to-two majority of the seats and also the chair.”). The last
time that the NLRB had more than three members from the same party was August 1956,
when four Republicans and one Democrat served on the Board; President Eisenhower
then named a Democrat to replace a retiring Republican. See Members of the NLRB
Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [http://
perma.cc/L7GB-PTN3] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
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agency independence”: an unwritten norm that has come to govern the
behavior of political actors with respect to the agency.132
The case of the NLRB allows us to examine whether a partisan
balance requirement that emerges from convention has the same effect
on ideological composition as a PBR set forth by statute. Table 4
compares the ideologies of appointees to the NLRB with the ideologies
of appointees to the twenty-two agencies with statutory PBRs for which we
have obtained data from 1979 to 2014. Under Democratic Presidents,
cross-party appointees to the NLRB appear, on average, to be slightly less
conservative than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs,
but this difference falls far short of statistical significance (p = 0.945).
Likewise, under Republican Presidents, cross-party appointees to the
NLRB appear on average to be slightly less liberal than cross-party
appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs, but again, this difference is
not statistically significant (p = 0.849). In short, we find little to suggest
that the difference between the NLRB’s partisan balance convention and
the statutory PBRs applicable to other agencies has any effect on
ideological composition—the NLRB looks much like the statutory PBR
agencies in terms of the ideological preferences of appointees.
TABLE 4: MEAN IDEOLOGY OF APPOINTEES TO NLRB AND STATUTORY PBR
AGENCIES
NLRB

Statutory PBR Agencies

Co-Party
Appointees

Cross-Party
Appointees

Co-Party
Appointees

Cross-Party
Appointees

Democratic
Presidents

-1.106
(0.309)

0.753
(0.774)

-0.898
(0.531)

0.776
(0.520)

Republican
Presidents

0.681
(0.760)

-0.341
(1.052)

0.863
(0.309)

-0.500
(0.797)

n = 578. Includes appointments made to the NLRB and twenty-two other agencies
during the period from 1979 to 2014. Cells report mean CFscores and, in
parentheses, standard deviations.

Indeed, when we focus on twenty-first century appointments, we find
evidence that the partisan balance convention at the NLRB has as much,
if not more, bite than statutory PBRs elsewhere. Since 2000, Republicans
appointed by Democratic Presidents to the NLRB have been, on average,
even more conservative—and Democrats appointed by Republican
Presidents to the NLRB even more liberal—than those Presidents’ cross132. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
1163, 1166 (2013).
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party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs.133 This conclusion, however, comes with an important caveat. Our dataset includes CFscores for
only six cross-party appointees—three Democrats appointed by President
George W. Bush and three Republicans appointed by Presidents Clinton
or Obama—between 2000 and 2014. This relative lack of data on crossparty appointees to the NLRB may not be coincidental. The Board has
suffered from persistent, politically motivated vacancies during the past
several administrations.134 Whereas Congress permits appointees to other
agencies to serve beyond the expiration of their terms until their successors are confirmed,135 NLRB members are not authorized to serve in an
acting capacity.136 That NLRB seats remain vacant until filled may
provide senators with an additional incentive to delay acting on
nominations to the Board (beyond their usual incentives to do so for
agencies when such delay leaves the existing appointees temporarily in
place). Accordingly, it is possible that partisan gamesmanship is
occurring with respect to cross-party appointees to the NLRB—it just
occurs at an earlier stage in the appointments process and thus is not
captured by the CFscores for those individuals that make it onto the
Board.
In sum, the partisan balance norm that exists by “convention” or
“tradition” at the NLRB appears to be driving a gap between co-party
133. Further, when the analysis is limited from 2000 to 2014, the results also lend
support to the conventional wisdom that the NLRB is an unusually politicized agency. See
Brudney, supra note 131, at 223–24; Samuel Estreicher, ‘Depoliticizing’ the National
Labor Relations Board: Administrative Steps, 64 Emory L.J. 1611, 1613 (2015) (explaining
that, in reference to the NLRB, “the perception of a ‘politicized’ agency seems stronger
than ever”); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should We Try to Fix
It?, 64 Emory L.J. 1495, 1496 (2015) (“The Board has become a controversial, often
politicized, agency whose best efforts are denounced by politicians and often overruled by
the Supreme Court.”). For each President–appointee combination, the mean NLRB
appointee is more extreme than the corresponding cell in the table for the other agencies
with PBRs.
134. See Mark Landler & Steven Greenhouse, Vacancies and Partisan Fighting Put
Labor Relations Agency in Legal Limbo, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/politics/vacancies-and-partisan-fighting-put-laborrelations-agency-in-legal-limbo.html?mcubz=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing the Senate’s refusal to confirm President Bush’s and then President Obama’s
nominees).
135. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that a CFTC commissioner
“shall hold office for a term of five years and until his successor is appointed . . . except
that he shall not so continue to serve beyond the expiration of the next session of
Congress subsequent to the expiration of said fixed term of office”); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2012) (providing similar restrictions on term lengths for the SEC); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7171(b)(1) (2012) (FERC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (FCC).
136. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3349b, 3349c(1)(A) (2012) (specifying that appointees to
multimember independent agencies cannot serve in a holdover or acting position unless
otherwise statutorily authorized); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (specifying that there is no
provision in the NLRB’s organic statute for continuation of service beyond the length of
the fixed term).
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and cross-party appointees that is broadly similar to the gap between coparty and cross-party appointees at agencies with statutory PBRs. The bite
of PBRs does not appear to depend on whether these provisions are
written into law. But whether we are dealing with a statutory PBR or a
PBR that arises from convention, the puzzle remains as to why these
requirements do anything at all to shape the ideological composition of
multimember agencies. The next section turns to that question and to
the implications of our results for various theories of PBRs’ efficacy.
C.

Market Forces and Appointee Selection

This section reevaluates this Article’s two main causal explanations
for the efficacy of PBRs—the supply-side theory and the demand-side
theory—in light of our empirical analysis. It also considers (and largely
rejects) alternative hypotheses that might account for the topline results
and time trends observed above.
1. Supply-Side Constraints. — Our results are broadly consistent with
the supply-side theory, which holds that Presidents are constrained in
their selection by the ideological composition of the pool of potential
cross-party appointees. As the political class from which the memberships
of boards and commissions are typically drawn becomes more
ideologically polarized along party lines, it becomes increasingly difficult
for a President to identify competent individuals whose ideological
preferences track the President’s own but whose party affiliation does
not. Presidents are reactive in this narrative; they appoint bona fide crossparty members because these are the only competent potential
appointees that “the market” supplies.
The time trends in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) support this theory. The
appointment of bona fide cross-party members gradually becomes more
prevalent from the late 1970s through the mid-2010s, while simultaneously, the political classes gradually became more ideologically distinct
along party lines. While it might seem surprising that a motivated
Democratic President cannot find a liberal Republican for a cross-party
seat or that a motivated Republican President cannot find a conservative
Democrat, the supply-side theory becomes more plausible if one
supposes that Presidents care about competence as well as ideological
alignment. To be sure, a Democratic President might still be able to find
someone in a nation of more than 300 million people who shares the
President’s liberal views but registers as an independent or a Republican,
and a Republican President might still be able to find someone who shares
that President’s conservative views but registers as an independent or a
Democrat. Yet while we observe past Presidents drawing cross-party
appointees from the pools of liberal Republicans and conservative
Democrats when these pools were much larger, we see relatively few
cross-party appointments of these types in recent years.
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2. Demand-Side Constraints. — The demand-side theory, by contrast,
finds much weaker support here. Recall that this theory views senators as
the “consumers” in the confirmation market to whom the President must
“sell” her favored nominees. One could imagine that Democratic
Presidents may want to appoint liberal Republicans to Republicandesignated seats and that Republican Presidents may have the inverse
desire, but that opposition-party senators use their advice-and-consent authority to block the appointments of moderates to party-specific seats.
The demand-side theory therefore holds that the presence of bona fide
cross-party commissioners on PBR agencies is attributable to pressure
from cross-party senators.
If this narrative is accurate, one would expect Presidents to appoint
genuine cross-partisans to cross-party seats only when cross-party senators
are sufficiently powerful to compel Presidents to do so. By contrast, when
cross-party senators do not have enough votes to block a party-memberin-name-only nominee, Presidents will have free rein to appoint
milquetoast partisans to cross-party seats. Essentially, one would expect
the ideological distance between appointing Presidents and cross-party
appointees to be positively correlated with cross-party senators’ power to
deny confirmation to disfavored nominees.
When do cross-party senators have the power to deny confirmation?
One possibility is that the ability to block cloture—and thus deny a vote
on a nominee—provides cross-party senators with a means of ensuring
that the Presidents appoint bona fide cross-party members to PBR
agencies. This explanation, however, cannot explain the time trend in
Figures 4(a) and 4(b)—that PBRs have come to exert stronger effects
over time. During virtually the entire study period, both parties held a
sufficient number of seats to block a nominee under Senate filibuster
rules.137 Yet, as Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, cross-party appointees did
not become ideologically distinct, at conventionally accepted levels of
statistical significance, until late in the period.
137. For almost the entire period from 1979 to 2014, confirmation of executive
branch nominees required the assent of sixty senators, which is the number needed to
invoke cloture under Senate Rule XXII. See Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 1138, Rule XXII, at 15–17 (2013) (providing that three-fifths of senators are required to
invoke cloture, i.e., to vote to limit further consideration of a pending question, thereby
permitting the question to be put to a majority vote). On November 21, 2013, the Senate
reinterpreted Rule XXII to allow fifty-one votes to invoke cloture for nominees to
positions other than the Supreme Court. Walter J. Oleszek, Cong. Research Serv., R44709,
Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress 8–9 (2016),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf [http://perma.cc/NER9-Y6WR]. Accordingly, a
unified opposition party holding at least forty-one Senate seats prior to that date, or fiftyone seats thereafter, could block a nominee. See id. (describing the Rule XXII
reinterpretation and the subsequent need for only fifty-one votes to confirm a nominee
other than one to the Supreme Court). This new interpretation applies only if the vote
occurs pursuant to a specific procedural posture. Id. The opposition party needs fifty-one
votes, rather than fifty, to block a nominee after November 21, 2013, because, in the event
of a fifty-fifty tie, the Vice President would vote for confirmation.
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Further, a recent change in Senate rules allows for a simple test of
the Senate’s potential role in giving PBRs their bite—and the results
suggest that role is limited. On November 21, 2013, the leadership of the
Senate Democratic majority exercised the “nuclear option” and altered
the chamber’s interpretation of Senate Rule XXII to reduce the number
of votes needed to invoke cloture for nominees to positions other than
Supreme Court justiceships from sixty to fifty-one (or fifty, with the Vice
President as a tiebreaker).138 For only the second time during the study
period, a unified cross-party (here, the Republicans) did not possess
sufficient votes to prevent a Senate majority from invoking cloture on a
confirmation vote for a nominee to a PBR agency. A Senate-focused
theory of PBRs’ bite would predict that President Obama’s appointees to
cross-party seats would tend to be more liberal after November 21, 2013.
In reality, however, appointees to cross-party PBR seats in the twelve
months after this date are 0.179 points more conservative than appointees
to cross-party PBR seats in the prior twelve months—a difference that is
in line with the long-term year-to-year increases in ideological distance
between the President and cross-party appointees displayed in Figure
4(b).
The other period during which a unified cross-party (again, the
Republicans) did not possess sufficient votes to block a Senate majority
from invoking cloture was July 7, 2009 through February 4, 2010.139 That
period was bookmarked, on one end, by the seating of Senator Al
Franken of Minnesota as the sixtieth Democratic senator following a long
recount, and, on the other end, by the seating of Senator Scott Brown, a
Republican from Massachusetts, after a special election that reduced the
Democratic caucus to fifty-nine.140 During that interval, the Obama
Administration’s appointees to cross-party seats were 0.111 points more
liberal than those in the period between President Obama’s inauguration
and Senator Franken’s swearing in. This slightly more liberal tilt in crossparty appointees during a period in which Democrats controlled the
White House and held a supermajority in the Senate hints at a demandside effect.
Trends following Senator Brown’s seating, however, cut against the
demand-side theory. Following Brown’s seating, Senate Democrats saw

138. See Oleszek, supra note 137, at 8–9.
139. See Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in
Senate, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/
01minnesota.html?mcubz=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Franken’s
seating would give the Democrats sixty seats in the Senate, which is sufficient to overcome
a filibuster); Janet Hook, Republican Scott Brown of Massachusetts Sworn in to Senate,
L.A. Times (Feb. 4, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/04/nation/la-nabrown5-2010feb05 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Brown’s seating
would reduce the Democrats’ numbers to fifty-nine, depriving them of their ability to avert
a Republican filibuster).
140. See Davey & Hulse, supra note 139; Hook, supra note 139.
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their filibuster-proof supermajority end. The demand-side theory
predicts that cross-party appointees would trend conservative based on
Senate Republicans’ relatively greater power during this period. Yet in
the twelve months following Brown’s seating, cross-party appointees were
0.093 points more liberal than they were during the interval in which the
Democrats held a supermajority. This slight liberal trend continued
through the date on which Senate Democratic leadership exercised the
nuclear option.
Table 5 compares the actual trends in cross-party appointee ideology
around these demand-side pivotal moments with the effects that we
might predict on the basis of the demand-side theory. (In all intervals in
the table, cross-party appointees are Obama appointees to Republican
seats.) In only one of the three intervals—roughly the odds one might
expect from three coin flips—does reality line up with the predictions
generated by the demand-side theory. While we cannot entirely rule out
the possibility that the opposition party’s ability to block a nomination
has a modest effect on the ideological composition of multimember
agencies, the evidence from these Obama-era shocks casts significant
doubt on the demand-side story.

TABLE 5: USING DEMAND SHOCKS TO ASSESS THE DEMAND-SIDE
HYPOTHESIS
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Intervals

Demand-side
theory
predicts crossparty
appointees
will be . . .
Cross-party
appointees
actually
were . . .
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Obama
Inaugurated–
Franken
Seated

N/A

N/A
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Franken
Seated–
Brown
Seated

Brown
Seated–
Nuclear
Option
Exercised

Nuclear
Option
Exercised–
End of
Democratic
Majority

more
liberal
than
previous
period

more
conservative
than previous
period

more liberal
than previous
period

more
liberal
than
previous
period

more liberal
than previous
period

more
conservative
than previous
period

But perhaps the demand-side mechanism is subtler than simply
whether a completely unified cross-party could prevent a floor vote. After
all, senators rarely utilize their Rule XXII prerogative for nominees to
executive branch positions.141 Of those executive branch nominations
that are reported out of committee, only 4% die on the floor, a figure
that includes failures to pass a cloture motion to end a filibuster,
filibuster threats, and individual senators’ holds on nominations.142 By
contrast, Senate committees fail to report out approximately 20% of
nominations, which effectively ends these nominees’ chances of
confirmation in most cases.143 The role that majority-party-dominated
committees play in the process suggests that a Senate party’s influence
over nominations is far broader—and perhaps harder to define—than
simply the binary matter of whether the party (if completely unified)
possesses forty-one votes to deny cloture.
To test the hypothesis that the power of the cross-party in the Senate
influences the President’s choice of moderates or ideologues for crossparty seats on PBR agencies, we regress the ideological distance between
each cross-party appointee and the appointing President (“CFscore
Difference”144) on the cross-party’s seat share in the Senate at the time of
141. See Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 10 (noting
that “many scholars have viewed floor votes as an afterthought” in the context of executive
branch appointments and that very few nominees fail floor votes).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Recall that positive values of CFscore in a Democratic (Republican)
administration indicate that the mean appointee is more conservative (liberal) than the
appointing President.
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each appointment (Model 1). As an alternative specification, we also regress CFscore Difference on whether the cross-party held a Senate
majority at the time of the appointment (Model 2); “Divided
Government” is coded as 1 if the cross-party held at least fifty-one Senate
seats.145 Finally, Models 3 and 4 add a time-trend variable into the mix.
“Time” signifies the number of years since the inception of the series in
1979 that a given cross-party appointee was confirmed. Including both
“Time” and either “Cross-Party Seat Share” or “Divided Government” in
these final two models enables us to pit the supply-side and demand-side
hypotheses directly against each other.
TABLE 6: SENATE COMPOSITION AND CROSS-APPOINTEE SELECTION
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Cross-Party
Seat Share

-0.036
(0.027)

N/A

-0.027**
(0.009)

N/A

Divided
Government

N/A

(0.227)

N/A

-0.202*
(0.100)

Time (Years
Since 1979)

N/A

N/A

0.043***
(0.006)

0.044***
(0.005)

n = 216. Unit of analysis: cross-party appointees to twenty-three agencies during
the period from 1979 to 2014. Carter years include 1979 and 1980 only; Obama
years include 2009 to 2014 only. Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. Robust
standard errors clustered at the two-year Congress-level are given in parentheses.
Table includes fixed effects for each presidency (baseline category: Carter
Administration). *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via
OLS regression.

Table 6 shows no support for the hypothesis that the cross-party’s
power in the Senate encourages the President to choose cross-party
appointees to PBR agencies whose views are further from the President’s
own. The coefficient estimates for “Cross-Party Seat Share” and “Divided
Government” are negative in all four models (and statistically significant
in two of the four), indicating the President selects cross-party appointees
145. To create both Cross-Party Seat Share and Divided Government, independent
senators who caucus with a particular party are classified as members of that party.
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who are closer to her ideal point when the cross-party is more powerful in
the Senate. These negative estimates are precisely the opposite of the
demand-side theory’s predication: that a stronger cross-party in the
Senate should pull cross-party appointees in its direction and away from
the President’s ideal point.
By contrast, the coefficient estimates for “Time” are positive and
statistically significant in both of the models in which they appear
(Models 3 and 4). As the series progresses—and as partisan sort
proceeds—cross-party appointees steadily become more extreme. When
tested against the demand-side theory, the supply-side theory retains its
explanatory power.
None of this is to suggest that individual senators are irrelevant to
the selection of cross-party appointees.146 In particular, the leader of the
opposition party in the Senate (the Minority Leader when the President’s
party controls the Senate, or the Majority Leader when it does not) often
plays an outsized role in the process.147 For example, Senate Republican
leader Bob Dole sent recommendations for cross-party appointments to
President Clinton throughout Clinton’s first term.148 Dole’s successor as
Senate Republican leader, Trent Lott, continued the practice149—in one
case clashing with fellow Republican Senator Orrin Hatch regarding the
respective roles of the leader and Senate committee chairs in cross-party
appointments.150 Senate Democratic leaders Tom Daschle and Harry
146. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independentagencies-sometimes-in-name-only.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
senior senators have been “instrumental” in the selection of SEC commissioners in recent
years).
147. See id. (noting that, in the early 2000s, the expectation was that the oppositionparty leaders would choose cross-party nominees).
148. See Kamen, supra note 58; see also Dina Elboghdady, Owen Sees ICC Post as
Capital Opportunity, Orange County Reg., Feb. 5, 1995 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that Clinton’s cross-party appointee to the ICC had been recommended
by Dole); Lynn Stevens Hume, Dole Urges Clinton to Name Unger, Banking Committee
Lawyer, to SEC Post, Bond Buyer, Sept. 19, 1995 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that Dole had recommended that Clinton name a Republican Senate aide to a
cross-party seat on the SEC); John Maggs, GOP Lawmakers Oppose Bragg as ITC
Chairman, J. Com. (May 25, 1994), http://www.joc.com/gop-lawmakers-oppose-bragg-itcchairman_19940525.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that other
Republican lawmakers were upset with Dole’s recommendation for a cross-party seat on
the USITC).
149. See, e.g., Senate Spat over Lott’s FCC Picks, Wired (Apr. 10, 1997),
http://www.wired.com/1997/04/senate-spat-over-lotts-fcc-picks (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (detailing Senator Lott’s recommendations for Republican FCC
commissioners).
150. See Michael Grunwald, Sentencing Panel’s Own Terms Are Up, Wash. Post (Aug.
28, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/08/28/sentencingpanels-own-terms-are-up/da055846-230d-448f-b33c11f596cb1f4d/?utm_term=.47875b15ee4f
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the conflict between Lott and Hatch). The
Sentencing Commission, an advisory panel, is located in the judicial rather than executive

64

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:9

Reid frequently forwarded names for cross-party appointments to
President George W. Bush.151 According to one account, Senate
Republican leader Mitch McConnell made a particularly concerted effort
to advance conservative ideologues for cross-party seats under President
Obama, whereas earlier leaders often selected nominees on the basis of
home-state connections or recommendations from other caucus
members.152 Most recently, a spokesman for Minority Leader Charles
Schumer said in March 2017 that Senate Democrats “intend to assert our
prerogative on nominees as always has been done,”153 and Schumer has
advanced several Democrats for cross-party appointments in the months
since President Trump took office.154
But while the leader of the opposition party in the Senate no doubt
plays an important role in the selection process, the widening ideological
gap between co-party and cross-party appointees should not necessarily
be attributed to Senate leadership. First, the role of Senate leaders is
purely advisory. As a formal matter, any provision that vested a Senate
leader with the statutory power to choose an executive branch officer
would violate the Appointments Clause of Article II.155 And as a practical
matter, Presidents do not always follow the suggestions of Senate leaders.
branch and so is excluded from our empirical analysis. About the Commission, U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, http://www.ussc.gov/ [http://perma.cc/ZNZ9-Z47M] (last visited
Oct. 2, 2017).
151. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Democrats Push S.E.C. Official for Commission Seat,
N.Y. Times (May 18, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9E0CE2DA1639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Judith
Burns, Daschle Recommends Hispanic-American Candidate for SEC, Dow Jones News
Serv. (Jan. 7, 2002) (available in full on Lexis Advance and on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Michele Heller, In Brief: Daschle Recommends Goldschmid for SEC, Am. Banker
(Jan.
30,
2002),
http://americanbanker.com/news/in-brief-daschle-recommendsgoldschmid-for-sec (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Mark Wigfield, Sen. Daschle
Recommends Democratic Aide for FCC Post, Dow Jones News Serv. (Nov. 15, 2001)
(available in full on Lexis Advance and on file with the Columbia Law Review).
152. See Daniel Foster, Agent McConnell, Nat’l Rev. (June 3, 2013), http://
www.nationalreview.com/sites/default/files/uploaded/20130603.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
153. Kelcee Griffis, Trump Nixes Rosenworcel Nomination to Return to FCC,
Law360 (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.law360.com/articles/897483/trump-nixes-rosenworcelnomination-to-return-to-fcc [http://perma.cc/8KCD-UE82] (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting a Schumer spokesman).
154. See, e.g., David Lieberman, President Trump Renominates Jessica Rosenworcel
to FCC, Deadline (June 14, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/06/president-trumprenominates-jessica-rosenworcel-fcc-1202113089 [http://perma.cc/NR34-XS4X] (noting
that Schumer recommended a cross-party nominee for President Trump); Harper Neidig,
Schumer Recommends Consumer Advocate for FTC, Hill (May 8, 2017), http://
thehill.com/regulation/finance/332535-schumer-recommends-consumer-advocate-for-ftc
[http://perma.cc/X9NA-RAD8] (noting that Schumer recommended someone to fill the
Democratic opening on the FTC).
155. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127–37 (1976) (striking down a provision in the
Federal Election Campaign Act that purported to authorize the President pro tempore of
the Senate and Speaker of the House to choose four members of the FEC).

2018]

PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE

65

For example, then-Senate Minority Leader Dole complained that
President Clinton often chose “Clinton Republicans” for cross-party seats
and ignored Dole’s recommendations.156 Likewise, then-Senate Majority
Leader Reid complained in 2008 that although he and President George
W. Bush “were able to work cooperatively on [cross-party] nominations”
through most of Bush’s second term, “there has been a notable shift in
the President’s stance on these nominations from one of cooperation to
intransigence,” with the Bush White House rejecting several of Reid’s
suggestions during the final year of the Bush presidency.157
Second, when Senate leaders recommend nominees, they do so in
the shadow of the White House’s range of acceptable options. Thus, even
when the President follows the opposition party leader’s recommendation, it would be a mistake to attribute the appointment to the
opposition party leader alone. Cross-party appointments often come at
the end of a back-and-forth process whereby the leader proposes a
nominee to a cross-party seat and the White House either accepts the
nomination or offers a counterproposal.158 These negotiations are
sometimes bound up in bargaining between the White House and
senators over issues unrelated or tangential to the appointment in
question.159
Third, insofar as cross-party appointments are driven by the opposition party’s Senate leader, we would expect that leader’s influence to be
at its peak when the opposition party holds more seats in the Senate. Yet
as illustrated by Table 6, our data do not bear out that prediction.
Remarkably, the extent to which Presidents choose genuine crosspartisans for multimember commission seats has no apparent
relationship to the political power of the opposition party leader.
Fourth and finally, while the median Senate Democrat and median
Senate Republican have grown farther apart ideologically over the course
156. Kamen, supra note 58.
157. Martin Kady II, Reid Letter Shows White House Rejected Nominee Compromise,
Politico: Politico Now Blog (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
politico-now/2008/02/reid-letter-shows-white-house-rejected-nominee-compromise-006621
[http://perma.cc/K89G-G8E4] (quoting a letter from Reid to White House Chief of Staff
Joshua Bolton). Reid’s letter also made the surprising—and flatly false—claim that “I have
the statutory authority to make recommendations to the President for Democratic positions
on independent boards and commissions.” Id. (emphasis added).
158. Telephone Interview with Ronald Weich, Former Chief Counsel to Senator Reid
(Aug. 29, 2017) (call notes on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also, G. Calvin
MacKenzie, Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments
Process 33 (2011) (describing “[p]ainstaking negotiations between the White House and
Senate stakeholders” regarding nominees to the FCC in 1997, as well as similar bargaining
between President Clinton and Senate Republican leaders regarding a cross-party
appointee to the FEC in 1999).
159. Email from Senator Jon Kyl, Former Senate Minority Whip, to Daniel Hemel,
Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (Aug. 25, 2017) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he minority is always looking for leverage, and nominations for
anything work.”).
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of our study period, we see much less ideological movement among the
parties’ respective Senate leaders. Figure 8, below, compares the
CFscores for the Senate Democratic and Republican leaders, denoted
with bold lines, with the median appointees to Democratic and
Republican seats on agencies with PBRs; appointees to co-party seats are
denoted with thin, solid lines, whereas appointees to cross-party seats are
denoted with dotted lines. As the figure shows, changes over time in the
median CFscores of cross-party appointees bear little discernable
relationship to changes in the CFscores of Senate leaders. For example,
Mitch McConnell, who led the Senate Republicans through the Obama
years, has a CFscore that is 0.030 points lower (less conservative) than
Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader under Carter, whereas the
median cross-party (Republican) appointee under Obama is 0.386 points
more conservative than the median cross-party appointee under Carter.
In other words, Republicans appointed by Democratic Presidents grew
much more conservative even while the Senate Republican leader (as
measured by CFscore) grew slightly less so. Likewise, Harry Reid, who led
the Senate Democrats during George W. Bush’s second term, has a
CFscore that is only 0.194 points lower than that of Robert Byrd, the
Senate Democratic leader under Reagan, while the median CFscore for
George W. Bush’s cross-party (Democratic) appointees is 1.190 points
lower than the median CFscore for Reagan’s cross-party appointees. That
is, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents grew substantially
more liberal even while the CFscore for the Senate Democratic leader
barely budged. In sum, we find little evidence to suggest that the
divergence between co-party and cross-party appointees over our study
period can be explained by an increase in the power of opposition party
senators or Senate leaders in the selection process.
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FIGURE 8: SENATE LEADERS AND APPOINTEES TO AGENCIES WITH PBRS
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3. Search Costs. — Along with increased partisan sort, another broad
social phenomenon that may have increased PBRs’ bite occurred during
this period: an information technology revolution that slashed the cost of
obtaining data on nominees. Forty years ago, learning a potential appointee’s detailed political views might require using one’s Rolodex to
contact members of the appointee’s social or professional circle and
investing the time and political capital to convince these mutual
connections to speak candidly (and, naturally, as a prerequisite, one
would need to have the connections and status to pull this off). Today,
one can procure similar information with a few keystrokes—as we did. As
a result, a wide variety of interested parties—including Senate staffers,
activists, and journalists—can inexpensively obtain information
regarding the ideologies of potential appointees. In light of the
reduction in the costs associated with obtaining this information,
perhaps the President’s ability to present conservative Democrats and
liberal Republicans as stealth nominees has diminished.
While this search-costs hypothesis has some appeal, we are skeptical
that it is driving our results for three reasons. First, this hypothesis understates the amount of information concerning potential appointees’ donations that was publicly accessible throughout this period. The FEC has a
long-established reputation for facilitating public access to its data.160 For
160. See R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Research Serv., R44318, The Federal Election
Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress 17 (2015), http://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44318.pdf [http://perma.cc/KLU2-MHMU] (“[T]he FEC
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virtually the entire period, the FEC considered reports on receipts and
FEC-generated indices of these receipts to be subject to the Freedom of
Information Act and thus endeavored to provide “the fullest possible disclosure” to the public.161 In 1980, Congress required the FEC to make
reports submitted by campaigns “available for public inspection” and to
“develop a filing, coding, and cross-indexing system” to facilitate public
access.162 The FEC met this obligation that same year.163 Since 1996, the
FEC has provided to the public comprehensive electronic records of
campaign contributions dating back to the late 1970s.164 In 1998, the FEC
debuted an internet-based search function that allows users to search the
FEC’s online database for specific donors by name.165
Access to campaign contributions data likely was more difficult prior
to the current era of searchable online databases. Still, interested parties
had the means to access this information throughout the study period.
Even during the years in which identifying contributors required reviewing indices of campaign contributions, the stakes to Presidents, senators,
and affected interest groups of placing a “disloyal” appointee on a board
or commission likely were sufficiently high—and the resources available
to these individuals and entities sufficiently deep—to outweigh these
relatively modest search costs.
Second, political donations are but one of several ways to convey an
individual’s partisan affiliation. Presidents and senators could employ
many other screens to divine potential appointees’ partisan affiliations:
for instance, whether an individual consistently votes in party primaries,
has a record of volunteering for political campaigns, or participates in a
political party or party-connected group. Indeed, the secular decline in
mass participation in civic activity over the past several generations

generally is praised for its role in publicizing campaign finance data.”); Jeremy Gaunt, A
Rocky Decade Later, the FEC Gets Little Respect, Campaign Prac. Rep., Feb. 11, 1985, at
1, 2 (“[M]ost . . . are willing to credit the agency with at least one major success. . . . [T]he
FEC has built on earlier attempts to make campaign finance data open to public scrutiny
and has made disclosure of campaign dollars an accepted and expected part of the
electoral process.”).
161. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(a), 5.4(a)(1) (2017). For versions of the rule in effect
between 1980 and 2010, see 65 Fed. Reg. 9201, 9207 (Feb. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 11
C.F.R. pt. 5); 52 Fed. Reg. 39,213 (Oct. 21, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 23,638 (June 24, 1987); 50
Fed. Reg. 50,778 (Dec. 12, 1985); 45 Fed Reg. 31,292 (May 13, 1980). But see 44 Fed. Reg.
33,368 (June 8, 1979) (stating that FOIA does not apply to reports of receipts and related
indices).
162. Act of Jan. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-187, sec. 109, § 311(a)(3)–(4), 93 Stat. 1339,
1362.
163. Telephone Interview with Senior Pub. Affairs Specialist, supra note 9.
164. Press Release, FEC, supra note 10.
165. Id.
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suggests that, in some respects, it may have been easier to discern an
individual’s partisan affiliation in 1979 than in 2014.166
Third, we construct what should be a relatively easy test for the
search-costs hypothesis—and obtain null results. This test exploits the
FEC’s introduction of a search function for its online database of
campaign contributions on July 21, 1998, which constituted the single
greatest reduction in search costs during this period. If the search-costs
hypothesis is doing any significant work, we would expect to see it here.
Yet we do not.
Model 1 in Table 7, below, is similar to the regression models
presented in Table 6, above, except that here, we add a dummy variable
denoting whether the nomination occurred after the search function for
the FEC’s online database became publicly accessible on July 21, 1998.167
A positive, statistically significant estimate for this coefficient would
support the alternative hypothesis that greater access to information
reduced the White House’s ability to get a “cross-partisan in name only”
past opposition party senators. Model 1, however, shows a null result.
Model 2 tests a slight variation on the alternative hypothesis. What if
interested parties gradually began to adapt to the FEC website’s new
search function, whether because they learned about the function over
time through word of mouth or because old-guard staffers were secularly
replaced with more internet-savvy political operatives? Instead of a
discrete jump in effect size following the rollout of the search function,
we would expect the time trend in the dependent variable to pick up
speed after July 21, 1998. In other words, we would expect a positive
coefficient on the interaction of the “date of nomination” and
“nomination after July 21, 1998” variables, which tests for this
phenomenon. As Model 2 shows, however, the coefficient on the
interaction term is statistically insignificant and, in fact, weakly
negative.168 In other words, we find little evidence that the ideological
166. Further, to the extent that members of Congress are consulted in executive
appointments, the fraying personal connections between legislators and their individual
constituents present an additional impediment to evaluating a potential appointee’s
partisan loyalty that is more significant in the later years of the study period. Compare
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts 31–35 (1978)
(looking at how House members “showed a good deal of personal attentiveness to their
districts” to “enlarge their political support at home”), with Richard F. Fenno, The
Challenge of Congressional Representation 10–12 (2013) (noting the continued lack of
scholarly attention to how and if representatives connect with their constituents to gain
their trust and support).
167. Observations in Table 7 are limited to the 145 cross-party appointees for whom
we were able to obtain the exact date of nomination.
168. We also ran a series of placebo tests, substituting July 21 of the years 1993 to 1997
and 1999 to 2007 in place of the “Nomination after July 21, 1998” variable and interactionterm component. These dates have no special relevance; we included them simply to
determine whether the coefficient estimates in models including these dates differ in any
meaningful way from the estimates reported in Table 7. The results of these placebo tests
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distance between the President and cross-party appointees increased at a
faster pace after the FEC’s website search rollout.
TABLE 7: EFFECTS OF FEC SEARCH FUNCTIONALITY ON CROSS-APPOINTEE
SELECTION
Model 1

Model 2

Divided Government

-0.304
(0.155)

-0.332
(0.170)

Date of Nomination

0.042**
(0.015)

0.045*
(0.017)

Nomination after July 21, 1998?

0.036
(0.272)

40.636
(98.771)

N/A

-0.020
(0.049)

Date of Nomination * Nomination
after July 21, 1998? (interaction
term)

n = 145. Unit of analysis: cross-party appointees during the period from 1979 to 2014
for whom we know the exact date of nomination (a subset of the dataset used in
previous models). Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. signifies p < 0.001, ** p <
0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via OLS regression. Parameter estimates for
the intercepts are omitted.

To sum up so far: Our results are consistent with a supply-side story
in which partisan sort starting in the 1980s tightened the relationship between party affiliation and ideology, and so the preferences of cross-party
appointees increasingly diverged from those of the appointing President.
are substantially similar to those reported in Table 7 (although the “Divided Government”
variable lacks statistical significance in most of these placebo models, as expected).
To determine whether a discontinuity in cross-appointee ideology exists around July
21, 1998, we constructed a regression-discontinuity model. However, a relative lack of
observations around the July 21, 1998 cut-point impeded the analysis; using any reasonable
set of parameter assumptions, the rdbwselect function in R recommended bandwidths of
approximately two years—hardly a knife-edge. Using this bandwidth, the model reported a
statistically significant, positive discontinuity at the cut-point. But we do not put much
stock in this result; given the unacceptably large bandwidth size, the model likely is picking
up the well-documented time trend and misreporting it as a “knife-edge” discontinuous
jump.
Finally, we constructed a regression-kink model, which tests for a discontinuous
change in slope, rather than an upward shift in the regression curve, at around this date.
The theory here is that interested parties may have learned about (and learned how to
use) the FEC’s searchable database gradually, and therefore we might expect a change in
the rate of growth in the ideological gap after this date, rather than an abrupt increase.
This model reported null results, but, once again, serious bandwidth selection issues
prevent firm conclusions.
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Our results are less consistent with a demand-side story in which the
power of the opposition party in the Senate (or the influence of its
leader) drives change over time in the ideological composition of
multimember agencies. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis
that an Internet-induced reduction in search costs has prevented recent
Presidents from filling cross-party seats with individuals whose campaign
contributions reveal that these appointees themselves are out of step with
their party of registration.
4. Identity Signaling. — Finally, the notion that appointment-seeking
members donate solely to convey that they are loyal party members may
bear on this analysis. Consider, for instance, a highly regarded product
safety lawyer angling for a seat on the CPSC. Her qualifications are
unimpeachable, but her involvement in partisan politics is either trivial
or dated.169 She may therefore benefit from donating to her party’s
candidates solely to convey that she is a member of that party. This
rationale stands apart from the sincere-versus-strategic dichotomy
discussed in section II.B.3. Although this behavior obviously is not a
sincere expression of closely held beliefs, neither is it strategic in the
sense that it is designed to misrepresent an individual’s ideological
preferences. It simply broadcasts: “I am a member of this team.”
If this motivation for political giving is widely held, then changes in
appointees’ ideal point estimates over time might not capture genuine
changes in their political views. Rather, if members of the political class
donate mechanistically to candidates on their party’s ticket, and the ideological composition of the ticket changes over time as a result of partisan
sort among candidates, then the observed longitudinal changes in
appointees’ ideal point estimates would be epiphenomenal. Phrased another way, whereas a Washington lawyer could show loyalty to the
Republican Party in 1970 by donating to Nelson Rockefeller, today she
might do so by giving to Ted Cruz. Neither action is necessarily infused
with much meaning; they both convey party loyalty—and, perhaps,
nothing more.170
169. This example is loosely based on Marietta Robinson, a product safety lawyer with
a long career representing both plaintiffs and defendants. Robinson ran as a Democrat for
a Michigan Supreme Court seat in 2000, served in several nonpartisan positions in the
2000s, and was appointed by President Obama to a Democratic seat on the CPSC in 2013.
170. Cf. Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in The Power of the Powerless 23,
27 (John Keane ed., 1985). Amusingly, the Washington lawyer’s behavior is reminiscent of
Havel’s classic description of shopkeepers in communist Czechoslovakia:
I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of shopkeepers
never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do they use them to
express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from
the enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all
into the window simply because it has been done that way for years, because
everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to refuse,
there could be trouble.
Id.
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We acknowledge that partisan sort among candidates may
encourage donors interested solely in signaling their party loyalty to
support more extreme candidates in 2014 than in 1979. But we caution
that this theory’s explanatory power is limited. First, it cannot account for
the fact that co-party and cross-party appointees differed markedly
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. That Democrats selected by President
Carter exhibit sharply different donation activity than Democrats
selected by President Reagan casts doubt on the notion that
appointment-seekers’ ideal point estimates merely reflect the ideal points
of their party’s candidates.
Second, and somewhat to our surprise, we found that appointees to
PBR agencies routinely make contributions to candidates from both
political parties. Even among appointees to the high-profile, highly
politicized FCC, a third of appointees in our dataset (eleven out of thirtythree) donated to both Democratic and Republican candidates. If likely
nominees are using campaign contributions solely to signal that they are
on “Team Blue” or “Team Red,” the signals they are sending are
remarkably noisy.
Third, even with the trend toward polarized parties, donors who give
exclusively to candidates from one party still have a wide variety of
options from which to choose. In 1980, the mean Republican candidate
on a general election ballot for state or federal office had a CFscore of
0.770, while the mean Democratic candidate’s score was -0.365. (Recall
that a higher CFscore indicates greater conservatism.) By 2014, those
means were 1.046 and -0.985, respectively. But the standard deviations
around these means also increased between 1980 and 2014: from 0.368 to
0.573 for Republicans and from 0.529 to 0.668 for Democrats.171 In other
words, party-loyal donors in 2014 could donate to a candidate who
adopted the posture of a 1980-style Democrat (or 1980-style Republican)
and who was still located within one standard deviation of the current
party mean. That Democratic (Republican) appointees did not give to
those more moderate candidates, and instead chose to give to more
liberal (conservative) candidates, provides further support for the claim
that appointees themselves have grown more extreme.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We can now say with some confidence that PBRs are more than
paper tigers—that they do indeed lead Presidents to choose cross-party
appointees with divergent ideological preferences. Our results have clear
implications for the leading accounts of PBRs in the political science and
administrative law literatures. Our results also suggest avenues for future

171. See Adam Bonica, All Recipients, 1979–2014, Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections (DIME) (2015), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=
2865309&version=RELEASED&version=.2 [http://perma.cc/DKY4-HLEJ].
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research on the effects of PBRs. This last Part considers those
implications and potential extensions of our project.
A.

The Monitoring Account

One perspective on PBRs in the political science and administrative
law literature emphasizes the relationship between PBRs and the cost of
monitoring agency actions. PBRs can reduce monitoring costs for
Congress in three ways. First, minority party commissioners are likely to
sound a “fire alarm” if the majority on the commission embarks on a potentially controversial course of action.172 These “fire alarms” make it easier for lawmakers to keep an eye on agencies: Instead of reviewing every
agency action individually, Congress can focus on instances in which minority party members dissent from a commission decision.173 Second,
beyond simply sounding an alarm, minority commissioners might further
reduce the costs of congressional oversight by providing lawmakers with
information about the consequences of agency actions as well as ways to
overturn those actions.174 Third, and relatedly, the same fire alarms that
alert Congress to questionable commission decisions also alert the
courts.175 This third mechanism can be considered as part of a multipronged strategy of congressional control: Congress creates agencies subject to PBRs, Congress also provides for judicial review of agency actions,
and minority commissioners alert the courts to instances in which agency
actions deviate from statutory directives.
The monitoring account might lead us to expect that lawmakers
would be most likely to impose PBRs when they are most worried about
the executive branch straying from their own policy preferences.
172. Barkow, supra note 87, at 41 (“[W]hen an agency is composed of members of
different parties, it has a built-in monitoring system for interests on both sides . . . [and is]
more likely to produce a dissent if the agency goes too far in one direction. That . . . serves
as a ‘fire alarm’ that alerts Congress . . . .” (footnote omitted)). The origins of the “fire
alarm” theory trace back to work by political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas
Schwartz. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166 (1984).
173. Alexander Bolton, Collegial Leadership Structures, Ideological Diversity, and
Policymaking in the United States 7 (Aug. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that ideological diversity and “minority votes can
serve to reduce the oversight costs of principals, giving commission chairs incentives to
moderate policies”).
174. Id. The presence of minority commissioners may also encourage majority
commissioners to provide greater information than they otherwise would. Even the
prospect of a dissent may serve an information-forcing function, compelling
commissioners in the majority to provide more fulsome explanations for their decisions in
an effort to dampen the potential dissenters’ fire alarm. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, State
Farm “with Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1605, 1657–60 (2014) (arguing that the prospect of inspector-general
investigations, congressional hearings, or judicial review may compel agencies to provide
better-reasoned explanations for their actions).
175. Bolton, supra note 173, at 13.
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Consistent with this expectation, Professor David Lewis observes that the
percentage of new agencies with appointment limitations such as PBRs is
highest in periods of divided government.176 Note, though, that while
Lewis’s finding is consistent with the monitoring account, it does not
confirm that account. Even if opposing party lawmakers seek to reduce
monitoring costs by imposing PBRs on new multimember agencies, their
efforts may prove fruitless.
What we can say is that certain empirical findings make the monitoring account appear more plausible. For the monitoring account to be accurate, a necessary but not sufficient condition is that PBRs actually lead
to ideologically diverse agencies with minority members who will alert
Congress and the courts if agency leaders stray from legislative
preferences or statutory directives. In that respect, our finding that the
ideological preferences of cross-party appointees in recent years have
indeed diverged from the preferences of the appointing President
supports the monitoring account’s claims.
Importantly, however, the fact that PBRs produce ideological
diversity in multimember agencies does not prove that PBRs succeed in
reducing monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. First, members
whose ideological preferences diverge from the White House occupant’s
may still exhibit loyalty toward the President who appointed them.
Professors Lee Epstein and Eric Posner have documented a powerful
“loyalty effect” among Supreme Court Justices, who are more likely to
vote with the Solicitor General when the President who appointed them
remains in office.177 This loyalty effect is distinct from the phenomenon
of Supreme Court Justices tending to support the administration when
the President is of the same party as the Justice’s appointer; the loyalty
effect is person-specific rather than party-specific. A similar loyalty effect
among members of PBR agencies might lead a conservative Republican
to support the policies of a Democratic President who appointed her
(and likewise for a liberal Democrat appointed by a Republican
President). A loyalty effect among cross-party appointees might
undermine the monitoring value of ideological diversity at multimember
agencies because minority party members might be reluctant to interfere
with the agenda of a President to whom they feel gratitude.
Second, even in the absence of a loyalty effect, agency members
whose ideological preferences diverge from the President’s might do
little to reduce monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. Minority
party members might be excluded from access to information about
agency decisionmaking, or they might be reluctant to blow the whistle on
their majority party colleagues, or their “fire alarms” might go unheeded
176. See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control
and Bureaucratic Performance 60–66 (2008) (“The number of appointees is also likely to
be higher when the president and Congress have similar views about policy.”).
177. Epstein & Posner, supra note 100, at 402–03.
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by lawmakers and judges. Evaluating the strength of the monitoring
account thus requires more than simply knowing how PBRs affect the
ideological composition of multimember agencies. We would need to
know whether the ideological composition of multimember agencies has
observable effects on interactions between agencies and Congress, and
between agencies and courts.178
While the analysis above cannot answer all questions regarding the
monitoring account’s accuracy, our topline results do provide guidance
for researchers studying this subject. Most significantly, our findings suggest that the effect of PBRs on monitoring costs may be time-variant:
How PBRs affected interactions between agencies and Congress—and
between agencies and courts—in the 1980s is not necessarily predictive
with regard to later years. Our results suggest that the effects of PBRs on
the ideological composition of multimember agencies from the Clinton
presidency onward are quite unlike the effects under Presidents Carter,
Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. Accordingly, the follow-on
consequences for monitoring costs may be different for later periods
than for earlier ones.
B.

The Deliberation Account

A second account of PBRs (which is distinct from, but not
inconsistent with, the monitoring account above) draws from the social
psychology literature on group polarization. Group polarization occurs
“when an initial tendency of individual group members toward a given
direction is enhanced following group discussion.”179 Numerous studies
have documented this phenomenon.180 Professor Cass Sunstein, who is
178. One of us has begun a project to study the effectiveness of congressional
oversight of administrative agencies using empirical methods. See Brian D. Feinstein,
Congress in the Administrative State, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript
at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2943074 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Studying
the relationship between ideological composition and congressional oversight is a
potentially fruitful path for future research.
179. Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1141, 1141 (1986).
180. Early experiments involved eighteen- and nineteen-year-old students in Paris who
were asked about their attitudes toward France’s then-President, Charles de Gaulle, and
the United States. Roger Brown, Social Psychology 223–24 (2d ed. 1986). Initial attitudes
toward de Gaulle were “mildly favorable”; after group discussion, sentiments toward the
President became even more favorable. Id. Initial attitudes toward the United States were
“mildly negative”; these views tended to become more negative following discussion. Id. In
both cases, group deliberation pushed group members toward the extreme. Id.
Another study presented subjects with traffic felony scenarios and asked them to rate
defendants’ guilt (from “definitely not guilty” to “definitely guilty”). David G. Myers &
Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 Personality & Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 63, 63–64 (1976).The subjects then discussed their impressions and rerated
the defendants. The discussion process consistently led subjects to become more extreme
in their views. Id. With respect to scenarios in which most subjects initially considered the
defendant to be guilty, group discussion strengthened their confidence in that view. Id.
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largely responsible for bringing the group polarization literature to the
attention of administrative law scholars, highlights two explanations for
the observed patterns of polarization. One emphasizes “social
comparison”: People want to be perceived favorably by their peers, and
so when surrounded by others with liberal (conservative) views, they seek
favor by adjusting their own views to be more liberal (conservative).181 A
second explanation stresses “limited argument pools”: Individuals are
influenced by the arguments they encounter, and an individual
confronted with only liberal (or only conservative) arguments is likely to
move further in that direction.182 Both of these explanations might
suggest that while individuals surrounded by others with like-minded
views will grow more extreme, individuals exposed to a diversity of
viewpoints may become more moderate.183 This diversity-leads-todepolarization hypothesis draws some support in the social psychology
literature, though this effect is stronger for group members confronting
a problem for the first time than for group members dealing with
familiar and much-debated questions.184
Sunstein argues that the social psychology literature on group polarization and depolarization produces potentially useful insights for agency
design. He writes:
An independent agency that is all Democratic, or all
Republican, might polarize toward an extreme position, likely
more extreme than that of the median Democrat or
Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any
member standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against movements of this kind.185
The verbs “might” and “can” are important: Extrapolations from laboratory experiments to the real world of multimember federal agencies
raise questions of external validity. Moreover, even in the absence of
PBRs, agency commissioners may be exposed to a rich pool of arguments
from sources other than their colleagues. Commissioners likely
When most subjects initially considered the defendant to be innocent, discussion likewise
pushed subjects even further toward the innocence extreme. Id.
181. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 88–89.
182. See id. at 89–90.
183. See id. at 89, 118–19.
184. See Brown, supra note 180, at 226.
185. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 103. In a similar vein, Professor Rachel Barkow
writes:
[A] partisan balance requirement . . . can avoid extremely partisan
decisions . . . . As a wealth of empirical research demonstrates, a group
composed solely of ideologically like-minded people tends toward extreme
decision making. Liberals and conservatives alike become more liberal and
conservative, respectively, when they deliberate only with like-minded
people. . . . [A] commission of five members all of the same party would be even
more polarized than one in which a bare majority is of the same party.
Barkow, supra note 87, at 40–41.
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encounter arguments from lawyers who practice before the agency,
lobbyists who seek to influence agency action, think tanks inside the
Beltway, and—on especially high-profile issues—news media.
Nonetheless, the literature on group polarization offers a potential
explanation as to how PBRs might affect agency decisionmaking. Here,
as elsewhere, ideological diversity may depolarize.186
Like the monitoring account, the deliberation account is difficult to
verify directly. What can be said is that for the deliberation account to be
accurate, it must first be the case that PBRs have the immediate effect of
producing ideological diversity. In this respect, our findings are supportive of the deliberation account.187 Increasing party polarization appears
to have the perhaps-unexpected effect of increasing the ideological
heterogeneity of multimember agencies. No longer do Democratic
Presidents fill seats on boards and commissions with like-minded liberals
who differ only in their party registration. No longer do Republican
Presidents stock multimember agencies with conservative Democrats and
conservative Republicans. Instead, we observe PBRs leading to
multimember agencies with a mix of liberal Democratic and conservative
Republican members.
That members are afforded opportunities to deliberate is a second
necessary condition for the deliberation account. If decisions are
preordained based on the views of the chair or those of an autonomous
professional staff, with the multimember structure merely serving as a
rubber stamp, then deliberation either will not occur or will be irrelevant
to policy outcomes. Although the evidence is limited, it seems that this
second condition is indeed met at most multimember agencies.
Commissioners are generally able to hire their own dedicated staff, and
thus have the capacity to critically evaluate proposals from the chair or
others and to suggest informed alternatives.188 Moreover, most
multimember agencies are required to undertake official action only at
or after a formal meeting with a quorum, which affords at least an opportunity to deliberate.189
But even assuming that these preconditions are met—namely, that
PBRs foster ideological diversity and that members have opportunities to
186. To be sure, partisan balance requirements theoretically could have the opposite
effect. Considering the possibility of partisan balance requirements for judicial panels,
Professors Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles note that “[p]erhaps both Republican and
Democratic appointees would conceive of themselves, to a somewhat greater degree, as
political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed composition would suggest as
much.” Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 Duke
L.J. 2193, 2228 (2009).
187. See supra section II.B.
188. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1168 (2000)
(describing members’ ability to select and supervise their own staffs).
189. See id. app. at 1236–94 (listing meeting requirements).
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deliberate—it does not necessarily follow that deliberation actually
occurs, much less that minds are changed. The question of whether
ideological diversity on multimember agencies has any effect on
decisional outputs still remains unanswered. But while this Article does
not seek to answer that question, it may be possible in future research to
assess the deliberation account in further detail. For example, one might
ask whether agencies that are more ideologically diverse are also less
likely to be reversed by courts, or less likely to commit “infractions” of
other kinds (that is, actions that elicit criticism from inspectors general,
the Government Accountability Office, or major newspapers).190 One
might also look at whether ideological diversity on multimember
agencies affects voting patterns of individual agency members.
Analogously, Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have found
evidence suggesting that on three-member circuit court panels, the
presence of an ideological minority has a moderating effect on the votes
of judges in the majority.191 Professor Richard Revesz has documented a
similar phenomenon in environmental law cases decided by the D.C.
Circuit.192 While these authors use party affiliation as a proxy for
ideology, our approach of using appointees’ campaign contributions can
allow for a richer analysis of ideological diversity and depolarization in
the agency context. Down the road, we hope to examine whether
ideological diversity leads agency members to gravitate together or pull
apart.
C.

The Obstruction Account

A third and final perspective on partisan balance requirements
posits that PBRs unconstitutionally interfere with presidential control
over the executive branch. The Justice Department under President
George H.W. Bush made a brief argument to this effect in a 1989 Office
of Legal Counsel memorandum: According to the memo, PBRs violate
Article II’s Appointments Clause193 because “[t]he only congressional
check that the Constitution places on the President’s power to appoint
190. On the measurement of agency “infractions,” see Feinstein, supra note 178
(manuscript at 24–25).
191. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 852 (2006) (“[B]oth
Democratic and Republican appointees show far more political voting patterns when they
are sitting on unified panels. When the panels are divided, the role of politics is greatly
dampened.”).
192. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1719 (1997) (sharing the results of a study on judicial decisionmaking in
the D.C. Circuit that found “a judge’s vote . . . is greatly affected by the identity of the
other judges sitting on the panel”).
193. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“The President . . . shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all . . . Officers of the United
States . . . but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper.”).
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‘principal officers’ is the advice and consent of the Senate.”194 The Office
of Legal Counsel listed PBRs as one of “ten types of legislative provisions
commonly included in proposed legislation that weaken the Presidency”
and that the executive branch should “consistently and forcefully
resist[].”195
A more full-throated version of this argument emerges from recent
work by Ronald Krotoszynski and coauthors. They rely on the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board,196 a case involving a five-member Board created to
regulate auditing of securities issuers. While the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is not subject to a PBR, its members were protected by “dual for-cause removal limitations”: They could
be removed only by the SEC and only for cause, and the SEC
commissioners could be removed by the President only for cause.197 The
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that “the dual forcause limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the
Constitution’s separation of powers.”198 But the opinion arguably stands
for the broader proposition that the President must have “meaningful
oversight and control powers over independent federal agencies.”199
Krotoszynski and coauthors argue that PBRs, when coupled with forcause removal limitations for agency members, potentially violate the
broader separation of powers principle embodied in the Free Enterprise
Fund decision. They write:
Statutory partisan balance requirements quite literally force
Presidents to rely on political enemies to carry out their
executive duties. . . . This is especially troubling considering the
increased polarization present in American political parties. . . .
Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements foster a
politically polarizing environment at the heads of independent
agencies. . . . [T]hese statutory partisan balance requirements
force Presidents to carry out their executive duties with contentious and highly polarized agency heads. . . . [and] preclude
a President from appointing a sufficient number of agency

194. Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C.
248, 250 (1989).
195. Id. at 248, 250. In a separate vein, law professor Jamin Raskin has argued that
PBRs violate the First Amendment and the principle of equal protection because they
discriminate on the basis of party affiliation. See Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and
Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission Unconstitutionally
Composed?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 609, 623–26 (2000).
196. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
197. Id. at 486–87. The SEC’s organic statute actually imposes no limitation on the
removal of commissioners. However, the parties in Free Enterprise Fund both agreed that
SEC commissioners are protected by an unwritten for-cause removal limitation. See id.
198. Id. at 492.
199. Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 948.
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commissioners in agreement with her political philosophy to
overcome the debilitating effect of partisanship.200
Notably, Krotoszynski and coauthors do not claim that PBRs are
always unconstitutional. They write:
If Congress requires the President to appoint political
opponents to an independent federal agency, but does not also
entrench such persons with a fixed term of office or good cause
protection against removal, it is difficult to see how a partisan
balance requirement on these facts would significantly impede
the President’s ability to oversee and direct the agency’s
operations.201
In their view, it is the combination of PBRs and for-cause removal
protections, rather than either of these provisions individually, that renders a large swath of administrative agencies unconstitutional. They conclude: “Congress should have the choice of mandating partisan balance
requirements or insulating principal officers who serve on agency heads
from removal; it should not be permitted to impose both conditions concurrently . . . .”202
There is, on reflection, something curious about the claim that forcause removal protections are constitutionally allowable but that the
combination of PBRs and removal protections raises problems. Consider
the case of the SEC, a five-member body whose commissioners serve
staggered five-year terms, with one term ending in June of every year.203
Suppose there were no PBR and so a two-term President (say, President
Obama) would have opportunities to fill every position on the
Commission. Assuming that President Obama could get all of his
nominees confirmed, he would be able to stock the Commission with
like-minded members during his eight years in office (indeed, by year
five). President Trump would then inherit an SEC with five liberal
Democratic commissioners. Each June, President Trump would be able
to appoint a conservative Republican to the expiring term, but it would
not be until June 2019—more than halfway through his first term—that
he could achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC.
At least arguably, partisan balance requirements make Presidents less
“rel[iant] on political enemies” insofar as they ensure that Presidents inherit commissions with only a bare majority of members hailing from the
opposite party. In the example above, President Trump would be able to
achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC the first time that
a Democratic-appointed commissioner’s term expires. In an analysis of
twelve multimember agencies subject to PBRs, Professors Neil Devins and
David Lewis find that following a change in party control of the White

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 991–92.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1005.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
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House, it takes an average of thirteen to fourteen months for the new
President to obtain a majority of co-partisans on a commission.204 In
other words, if historical patterns hold, it will take President Trump an
average of thirteen to fourteen months from inauguration—until March
or April of 2018—before a majority of commissioners are Republican. By
contrast, it takes an average of twenty-six months for a new President to
appoint an absolute majority of members—until March of 2019 before a
majority of commissioners are Trump appointees.205
Thus, the extent to which PBRs make a President reliant on commissioners whose ideologies differ from the President’s own views depends
critically on whether PBRs actually push Democratic Presidents to
appoint conservative Republicans (and, vice versa, whether PBRs actually
push Republican Presidents to appoint liberal Democrats). If PBRs
impose only a weak constraint, such that a Democratic President can
appoint liberals to both Democratic and Republican seats, then it will
take longer for a new conservative Republican President to fill a
commission with conservatives. If PBRs impose a stronger constraint on
ideology, then a new conservative Republican President will be able to
assemble conservative majorities on commissions much more quickly.
From this perspective, our results should be reassuring to those who
worry that multimember agencies subject to PBRs whose members enjoy
for-cause removal protection will interfere with the President’s pursuit of
her policy agenda. As PBRs become increasingly effective at generating
ideological diversity on multimember agencies, they may in fact do less
rather than more to obstruct the sitting President.
CONCLUSION
Our topline result can be summarized in a single sentence: Since the
mid-1990s (but not in the decade and a half before), partisan balance requirements have shaped the ideological composition of multimember
agencies by forcing Presidents to fill cross-party seats with appointees
whose preferences diverge from their own. In other words, partisan balance requirements indeed bite, but they have come to do so only
relatively recently. These findings are broadly consistent with supplyside developments: As ideology and party identification have become
more closely correlated, Presidents have found it more difficult to
identify competent cross-party appointees whose policy preferences they
share. And as a consequence, the decades-long trend toward partisan sort
in American politics has led to multimember boards and commissions
composed of very few cross-party appointees sharing the ideology of the
President who appointed them. Democratic Presidents may still be on
the hunt for liberal Republicans to appoint to cross-party seats (and
204. Devins & Lewis, supra note 79, at 470. Devins and Lewis analyze data from 1921
to 2005. Id.
205. Id.
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Republican Presidents for conservative Democrats), but with fewer of
these creatures left in the wild, Presidents increasingly are compelled to
select their ideological opponents for cross-party seats.
Our results suggest a novel twist on the standard narrative of
partisan polarization. The conventional wisdom holds that increased
partisan polarization has strained the architecture of government. At
agencies subject to PBRs, however, the effects of partisan sort may be
salutary. Partisan sort may lead Presidents to select bona fide cross-party
members, who in turn serve as in-house monitors and counterbalance
tendencies that might drive groups to go to extremes.
We cannot yet say definitively that PBRs reduce the costs borne by
Congress and the courts in watching over multimember agencies. Nor
can we confidently say that PBRs improve deliberative processes inside
agencies. This study is a first step toward resolving those questions, but it
is not a final answer. What we can conclude, based on the data analyzed
here, is that PBRs appear to enhance the ideological diversity of
multimember boards and commissions throughout the federal
bureaucracy. At a time of heightened concerns regarding partisan
polarization in Washington and across the country, that in itself is no
mean feat.

